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I. INTRODUCTION
We often frame the debate over global governance as a conflict
between some set of international legal norms, like free trade or human
rights, and something we posit as national "culture."' State actors and
legal scholars assert cultural claims as a strategy for resisting global
governance. For example, European states seek exemption from inter-
national trade agreements prohibiting barriers to the importation of U.S.
films, music and television, which they believe threaten European cul-
ture.2 Japan, Norway, and some indigenous North American tribal
nations claim a cultural right to whale that supersedes the international
moratorium on whale hunting.3 Some theocratic and developing states,
like Iran, Bangladesh, China, Argentina, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, claim
cultural exceptions to engage in practices that otherwise contravene the
international human rights of women and sexual minorities. In general,
the international community5 does not regard practices that implicate
commercial trade or environmental resources as cultural. By contrast,
the international community acknowledges that gender norms and roles
1. I am using the term "global governance" here to refer to the whole constellation of
international norms and relationships that affect public and private actors. Global govern-
ance is distinguishable from supranational government, and it has developed in tandem with
globalization. See generally David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Com-
parativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 551, 563-575,
(1997)(describing how public international law manages the conflict between national cul-
ture and global governance).
2. See, e.g., John David Donaldson, Television without Frontiers: The Continuing Ten-
sion Between Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J.
90 (1996) (discussing European Union concerns with imported television programming).
3. See, e.g., M. R. Freeman, Social and Cultural Significance of Whaling in Contempo-
rary Japan: A Case Study of Small-Type Coastal Whaling, in KEY. ISSUES IN HUNTER-
GATHERER RESEARCH (Ernest S. Burch, Jr. and Linda J. Ellanna, eds. 1994); Martha How-
ton, International Regulation of Commercial Whaling: The Consequences of Norway's
Decision to Hunt the Minke Whale, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.REv. 175 (1994); Kazu
Sumi, The "Whale War" Between Japan and the United States: Problems and Prospects, 17
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317 (1989).
4. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVES (Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994); THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE 11-72 (Carol Elizabeth Lockwood, Daniel Barstow Macgraw,
Margaret Faith Spring & S. I. Strong, eds., 1998) (describing the resistance of developing
and theocratic states to the progressive development of women's rights through the United
Nations); WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Julie
Peters & Andrea Wolper, eds., 1995); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Hu-
man Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307
(1994) (discussing how certain interpretations of Islamic law regarding women's rights dis-
place international law).
5. 1 use this term to reference both state actors and international legal scholars who
contribute to the creation and understanding of international legal norms.
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are intrinsic to national culture and accords them great deference.6 How
and why do we posit some social behavior as authentically "cultural,"
and when does "culture" trump international legal norms? This article
explores how state actors? and legal scholars make cultural claims in
different legal contexts and suggests a linkage between the deployment
of cultural exceptions and the project of globalization8 .
Human rights scholars are familiar with the problem of cultural re-
sistance to global governance. 9 Yet other areas of international legal
scholarship largely disregard the question of cultural relativism pre-
cisely because scholars do not acknowledge these contested practices as
cultural. Most international trade law scholars, for example, dismiss
cultural resistance as transparent protectionism." Some scholars in
6. Throughout this article I will refer interchangeably to "gender equality norms" or
"the fights of women and sexual minorities." I use the term "sexual minorities" to include all
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered persons. There is obviously a close connection
between gender and sexual roles or sexuality, Some argue that discrimination against sexual
minorities is based upon, and perpetuates, stereotypes of men and women. See generally
Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 187
(1998). The most egregious examples of gender discrimination often occur in countries with
extreme forms of discrimination against sexual minorities, such as Iran. Moreover, as dis-
cussed more fully below, countries opposing international rights for women often allege that
gender equality promotes homosexuality. See Felice D. Gaer, And Never the Twain Shall
Meet? The Struggle to Establish Women's Rights as International Human Rights, in THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE 46 (Carol Elizabeth
Lockwood et. al eds., 1998).
7. I realize, of course, that non-state actors, especially nations within states, also in-
voke cultural exceptions. I compare below one example of a cultural exception invoked by
an indigenous tribal nation with a comparable cultural exception invoked by states.
8. Globalization refers to both the worldwide process of liberalizing state controls on
the international movement of goods, services and capital and the social, economic and po-
litical consequences of liberalization. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (1999).
9. See, e.g., Guyora Binder,. Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human
Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1999) (rejecting the charge that international
human ights represent cultural imperialism); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal
Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTs. Q. 400 (1984)(defending the universality of certain rights); Karen
Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L.
L. & POL. 291 (2000) (arguing for the importance of cultural narratives in human rights
discourse); Makau-wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L. L. 589 (1996)
(criticizing human rights discourse as imposing western ideology on the Third World); Di-
anne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COL. HuM. RTS. L. REV.
1 (1997) (rejecting the universality of rights in favor of a transformative "consciousness of
the multiplicities and incommensurabilities"); Fernando R. Teson, International Human
Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L. L. 869 (1985) (international human fights
must be universal, but international law requires respect for national cultures).
10. It is significant, for example, that treatises on GATT law do not give serious consid-
eration to the cultural exception argument. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990); JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYS-
TEM 206-208 (1989); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1995).
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environmental law might weigh the cultural claims of indigenous na-
tions against environmental norms, but generally, they regard cultural
claims by states with suspicion.
Cultural resistance to global governance is the product of the twin
concepts of culture and sovereignty. Our traditional conception of sov-
ereignty assumes in part that the nation-state is identified with a
particular national culture." The state acts within a cultural context that
legitimates the exercise of state power. Internally, culture creates a bond
of nationality between the individual and the state, and nationality along
with territory defines the reach of sovereign jurisdiction. Externally,
culture justifies the use of force to project and protect national values. 2
The conventional view of state power assumes that culture is pre-
political, in the sense that culture precedes and constitutes the state, and
the state exists to protect national culture from foreign influence.
State actors and legal scholars invoke the term "culture" as an ex-
ception to an international legal norm without acknowledging that the
term itself is contested.'3 Claims about culture reference a complex rela-
tionship between sovereignty, civilization and colonialism. Cultural
anthropologists have long recognized the difficulty of defining
"culture." Our modem understanding of culture reflects the instability
of the concept.' We imagine culture as something that is offered to the
11. The French political theorist Bodin introduced the idea of the sovereign as the su-
preme power within the state territory in his work, De la Ripublique, in 1577. In De Cive,
Hobbes asserted further that the sovereign was supreme even over the church. Sovereignty
has been the basis for international law at least since the treaties known as the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War. See Treaties of Peace Between
Sweden, France and the Holy Roman Empire (October 14, 1648), I.C.T.S. 119-356; Leo
Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L. 20 (1948). By rejecting the
religious authority of the Holy Roman Emperor, the peace treaties established that each state
was sovereign within its own territory and free to choose its own religion. In this way, sover-
eignty was equated with a particular language and religious tradition. The Peace of
Westphalia guaranteed that culturally distinctive states would possess sovereignty equality.
See generally Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Peace of Westphalia (1648), in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 536-39 (1984).
12. For example, China justifies its invasion and occupation of Tibet by arguing that it
is bringing modernity and culture to a backward society. Similarly, the British justified their
colonization of India by reference to the religious and cultural values they introduced to a
heathen country.
13. See id. at 31-33. Originally, "culture" referred to cultivation of crops or animals.
See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 77 (1976). By the eighteenth century, German phi-
losophers used the term, "kultur" to refer to the process of educating or civilizing an
individual, and eventually, the term culture became a synonym for "civilization." See ADAM
KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS' ACCOUNT 30-32 (1999).
14. Clyde Kluckhohn categorized 164 definitions of culture. See id. at 56. These in-
cluded: "the total way of life of a people"; "the social legacy the individual acquires from his
group"; "a way of thinking, feeling, and believing"; "an abstraction from behavior"; "an
anthropological theory about group behavior"; "a storehouse of pooled learning"; "a set of
[Vol. 22:1
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masses as a kind of spiritual uplift. At the same time, the ethic of cul-
tural relativism teaches us that high culture, folk culture, and popular
culture are all "equal." Our contemporary stance of cultural pluralism or
multi-culturalism is inherently ambivalent. Tolerance counsels us to
regard cultural differences as unimportant; we strive to find common
ground among cultures. Yet, the politics of cultural identity celebrates
cultural differences and seeks to preserve them. At the same time that
anthropologists reject essentializing cultural differences, the politics of
cultural identity seem to embrace essentialism.15 I will not attempt to
define culture, but rather, I am interested in exploring why we accept
some practices as authentically "cultural" and not others. I use the term
"culture" here only in the same way that state actors and legal scholars
invoke the term to resist international legal norms.
Historical forces shaped culture's shifting, indeterminate meaning.
The idea of culture originated as a justification for colonialism. In ex-
change for territory and wealth, the Europeans offered culture to the
uncivilized mass of humanity.16 In the nineteenth century, culture repre-
sented the rational linear historical evolution toward becoming a
modern European state. 7 In this sense, culture embodied European
standardized orientations to recurrent problems"; "learned behavior"; "a mechanism for the
normative regulation of behavior"; and "a precipitate of history." CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 4-5 (1973) (quoting CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, MIRROR FOR MAN
(1965)). Kluckholn concluded that "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and
for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols." KUPER, supra note 13, at 58 (quoting
A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Klockhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions,
in 47 PAPERS OF THE PEABODY MUSEUM, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 1, 15 (1952)). Similarly,
Geertz defined culture as "historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in sym-
bols." GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 89. James Clifford acknowledged that culture is an unstable
concept, and that culture, identity and ethnography are so intertwined that an observer can-
not escape the trap of subjectivity. Clifford described the historicized idea of culture as a
social construct. See generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988).
15. See KUPER, supra note 13, at 238-242. See generally DAN DANIELSON AND KAREN
ENGLE, IDENTITY POLITICS (1994); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990)(rejecting the idea of gender essentialism, namely,
"the notion that unitary 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described inde-
pendently of race, class, sexual orientation and other realities of experience.").
16. In Chief Justice John Marshall's words, "The potentates of the old world found no
difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of
the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited inde-
pendence." Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823).
17. See KUPER, supra note 13, at 5-10; 1 EDWARD B. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE:
RESEARCHES INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MYTHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, LANGUAGE,
ART AND CUSTOM 1-2 (1870). Nineteenth-century Europeans assumed that humankind natu-
rally evolved from the primitive to the civilized according to universal natural laws that
could be studied and generalized from one nation to another. See, e.g., id. at 3-6,9-23
(1870); Williams, supra note 13, at 90 (citing G. F. KLEMM, ALLGEMEINE KULTUR-
GESCHICHTE DER MENSCHHEIT (General Cultural History of Mankind) (1843-52)). Cf
JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL (1997) (showing how culture is a product of
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attitudes of racial superiority." As culture set Europeans apart from
other nationalities,' 9 it defined nations and states .
By the end of the nineteenth century a new conception of culture
emerged. Just as the idea of culture defined nationhood, the idea of cul-
ture itself divided along national lines.2' Late nineteenth-century British
social critics of industrialization contrasted the soulless mechanical
quality of urban society with the humanity and spirituality of primitive
different geography, biology and history); DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY
OF NATIONS (1998) (explaining how economic progress results from the complex interplay
of culture and unique geographical and historical circumstances).
18. Critics of colonialism attacked this use of the term culture as an arrogant pretense.
The German philosopher Herder wrote of culture that "nothing is more indeterminate than
this word, and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations and periods." WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 13, at 79 (citing JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, IDEAS ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF MANKIND (1784-91)). European imperialism regarded
colonial people as nothing more than ashes "to manure the earth," so that "at the end of time
[their] posterity should be made happy by European culture." Id. He described the European
claim of cultural superiority as "a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature." Id. Herder, like
others in the Romantic Movement, idealized local culture as opposed to the elitist view of
European civilization. See id. Culture, in this sense, was an antidote to the formal, unnatural
class-oriented structure of European society.
19. See ROBERT J. C. YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDITY IN THEORY, CULTURE,
AND RACE 4-32 (1995).
20. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of
Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21, 25 (Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1998).
21. Conflicting ideas of culture grew out of national differences among European and
American social scientists. See KUPER, supra note 13, at 29-46. For example, the French
idea of culture was born out of the Revolution and the Enlightenment. For the French, the
process of becoming cultured was a rational, universal and progressive evolution. See id. at
30-31. Culture would flow inexorably from France to the world and transform every aspect
of social, political and spiritual life. See id.
By contrast, early twentieth-century German intellectuals viewed culture as the process
of becoming educated. See id. at 31. Culture imposed order, discipline and spiritual values.
Without culture, society descended into barbarism. French culture was rational, material and
cosmopolitan as against the spiritualism and romanticism of the German volk. German na-
tional idealism clashed with French cosmopolitanism. See id. at 31-34. German intellectuals
described this contrast between the French and Germans in terms that sound remarkably like
the present debate over preserving national culture from the rationalizing material forces of
globalization.
British intellectuals feared that either the soulless oppressive influence of industrializa-
tion or the crass materialism of mass consumerism would debase high culture. See id. at 36
(citing MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY (1869)).
The American conception of culture developed as more inclusive and democratic than
any of the Europeans'. See id. at 56. "Culture, or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic
sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." Id. (quoting E.
B. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE 1 (1871)). Anthropologists in the United States integrated
the disparate European traditions and redefined anthropology as a science of the symbolic
dimension of culture. See id. at 53 (citing TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL
ACTION (1937); TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951)).
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culture, which they romanticized as morally superior. Anthropologists
drew attention to the culture of colonized nations. By identifying certain
prevalent practices among some dominant groups as "cultural," anthro-
pologists privileged one idea of culture over others and mapped a
European concept of nationality onto Africa and Asia. By acknowledg-
ing all cultures as morally equivalent, twentieth-century anthropology
challenged the legitimacy of European imperialism. At the same mo-
ment that European powers wielded culture as a sword to project their
political and economic hegemony, some social scientists deployed cul-
ture as a critique of European imperialism. Since the mid-twentieth
century, newly independent states of the Third World have invoked na-
tional culture as a shield against European and American hegemony.
Ironically, these former colonies have appropriated the concept of
"culture" from their colonizers."
Despite the instability of the concept of culture, state actors and le-
gal scholars deploy cultural claims as a strategy for resisting global
governance. Trade is one of the principal sources of this cultural resis-
tance. Cultural-importing states often try to restrict cultural imports,
which they regard as threatening their cultural autonomy. In response,
cultural-exporting states generally dismiss claims of cultural autonomy
as either a restraint on the free flow of information or a form of eco-
nomic protectionism.24 This international debate, of course, reflects
internal debates within these foreign countries over the meaning of
western democracy and market liberalization. Democracy and market
liberalization have contributed to a backlash against western ideology
and culture in the form of religious fundamentalism and extreme na-
tionalism.
Cultural resistance to global governance is a displaced response to
the anxiety produced by globalization. It exists within western countries
as well. The rise of the Christian Right and the proliferation of extreme
militia groups in the United States are arguably a response to economic
displacement and the sense that the country can no longer control its
22. See KUPER, supra note 13, at 40-46. These critiques of industrialization shaped the
idea of culture among British intellectuals. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY
i-xi, 90,117 (1983).
23. Today, U.S. anthropologists view culture as a way of referencing differences, rather
than as a meaningful sociological category. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 211-12. The
discourse of culture has become a means to empower a particular community to resist the
forces of globalization.
24. See Debate Over EC's Attempt to Exclude Audiovisual Sector from GATS Contin-
ues, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1628 (Sept. 29, 1993). Richard Self, the U.S. Chief
Negotiator for GATS, commented that "what is truly frightening to the U.S. is the idea of a
cultural exception. To make culture untouchable is to enable people to protect anything be-
cause no one has a universal definition of culture." Id.
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destiny independent of the world economy.25 The growing popularity of
extreme nationalist groups in France, Austria, Germany, and the former
Soviet Union countries all signal the same reaction against globaliza-
tion. What Justice Scalia has characterized as the "Kulturkampf' 26 is an
international phenomenon rooted in anxieties over globalization.
This article maps out the terrain in which state actors and legal
scholars make claims premised on a cultural exception to justify dero-
gating from international legal norms. My aim is to understand why
some of these claimed cultural practices displace international legal
norms, while other practices are dismissed as violating international
legal norms. Part II will examine this discourse in relation to the rights
of women and sexual minorities. I will show that the international
community generally regards gender norms as cultural and the interna-
tional legal norm of gender equality usually defers to national cultural
practices. Part III discusses the discourse of cultural exceptions in the
context of international trade. I will argue that when states assert a right
to protect themselves from cultural imports, like publications, film,
sound recordings, and television programs, the international community
generally rejects these claims as a pretext for economic protectionism.
Part IV considers cultural exceptions to international environmental
norms. Some states argue that they have the right to trade in the prod-
ucts of endangered species based upon traditional cultural practices. The
international community refuses to recognize these practices as
"cultural" and insists on compliance with the international legal norm.
However, as I will argue, the international community does accept these
practices as "cultural" among some indigenous nations and has granted
a de minimis cultural exception to environmental norms for these in-
digenous nations. Finally, Part V attempts to reconcile the apparently
inconsistent treatment of cultural claims. I conclude that cultural claims
are accepted only to the extent that they facilitate globalization by dis-
placing popular anxiety caused by market liberalization.
25. For example, a recent Pew Research Center poll found that 52% of Americans fear
globalization. Among persons earning less that $50,000, only 37% believe that globalization
would help them. See Andrew Kohut, Globalization and the Wage Gap, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3,
1999, at A31. See generally JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN (2000); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE
WORLD, READY OR NOT (1997).
26. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia in dissent, defending a Colorado
State constitutional amendment barring the state and localities from passing ordinances to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.) The word "kulturekampf" or cul-
ture war refers to the effort by Bismarck to purge Catholic influences from German society.
Here Justice Scalia's use of the term may have revealed more than he intended.
[Vol. 22:1
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II. CULTURAL EXCEPTIONS TO GENDER EQUALITY
A. The Norm of Gender Equality
State actors and legal scholars generally regard most of the rights
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N.
Covenants on Human Rights as universal.27All states regardless of cul-
tural differences accept the international prohibitions against slavery,28
torture,29 or the wanton taking of innocent human lives." Although some
critics would argue that the idea of "rights," reflects western liberal in-
dividualist ideology that is not necessarily shared by all societies, the
basic principles enshrined by these U.N. instruments are universal.3
Among these principles is the norm of gender equality.32 Most states
agree that men and women should enjoy formal equality under the law.
Yet, states often regard substantive equality (by which I mean rights like
reproductive freedom, equal employment and educational opportunities,
and equal authority and property rights within the family) as less uni-
versal.33 For our purposes, I will refer to this cluster of formal and
substantive equality rights as the "international norm of gender
27. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 3, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
28. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, Conven-
tion Outlawing Slavery.
29. See Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2, 23 I.L.M. 1027, modified, 24 I.L.M. 535.
30. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, at art. 6;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 27, at art. 3.
31. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 181-93 (1990).
32. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." (emphasis added) Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 27, at art. 2. The U.N. Charter presumed that men and women should be equal. It
stated that one of the four purposes of the Organization is to promote "respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion .... U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. The norm of gender equality is also contained in
article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27; Art. 3
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 27; and
Art. 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, art. 2, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
33. See Donnelly, supra note 9, at 400 (human rights are universal, but certain tradi-
tional practices involving women and the family, such as marriage, cannot be subject to
universal rules); JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 34-38 (1993) (human
rights are universal, except when they conflict with certain traditional practices such as the
wearing of the veil in Islamic countries).
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equality."34 Gender equality implicates the rights of men, sexual minori-
ties, family, and children, as well as women."
The international community generally accepts the idea that the
norm of gender equality implicates culture.36 For example, many states
have conditioned their acceptance of the Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)37 upon cultural circum-
stances. Some Islamic and Third World states invoke cultural
circumstances as a justification for limiting a woman's right to marry,
divorce, control her reproduction, exercise custody over her children,
retain property, obtain an education, pursue certain professions, work
outside the home, or form an intimate relationship or household with
another woman.38 Some states also invoke their culture to defend dis-
crimination against, and persecution of, sexual minorities, including loss
of family rights, denial of employment opportunities, physical abuse,
imprisonment and even capital punishment.39 There is also a broad de-
bate among scholars whether the norm of gender equality is universal or
culturally relative. 40 The rights of women and sexual minorities are
34. State parties to the International Covenants and CEDAW sometimes use reserva-
tions to carve out exceptions from the norm of gender equality. Arguably, there is no
consensus for gender equality except in the sense of formal equality. The interesting ques-
tion here is why states use culture to justify their reservations to gender equality.
35. The rights of children are also closely related to gender, since they depend in part
on the rights of both parents to act on behalf of the child. Young girls, in particular, are often
subject to discrimination and violence as a consequence of both their age and gender, and the
exploitation of children in production, pornography and prostitution is also related to the
exploitation of women in the same circumstances. CEDAW explicitly recognizes this con-
nection by protecting the rights of children. Article 16, paragraphs (1)(d) and (f) provide that
the interests of children relating to family relationships are paramount; Article 16, paragraph
(2) prohibits child marriage.
36. I use the term culture here to include religion. The difficulty of defining the term is
discussed above.
37. See CEDAW, supra note 32.
38. See generally Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Na-
tions Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the
Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949 (1995); Mayer, supra
note 4, at 323-24.
39. See, e.g., ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT 3-9, 89-104
(1995).
40. See, e.g., A. RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS
RELATIVISM (1990); Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human
Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 345 (1991); Nancy Kim,
Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperi-
alism, and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (1993); Vasuki Nesiah,
Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of U.S. Feminist Legal Scholarship, 16
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1993); Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Free-
dom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795
(1992).
41. The international community is most likely to defer to culture when men or women
challenge traditional gender roles by asserting non-traditional sexuality. Restrictions on
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especially vulnerable to the authority of culture. I will focus my discus-
sion on the effect that cultural exceptions have on these groups.
The idea that gender equality is subject to, or bounded by, culture
reflects the traditional divide between the public and private realms in
international law. 2 This divide also exists in domestic law.43 Tradition-
ally, most societies confine women's roles to the domestic sphere of
home, marriage, and family; women are not readily accepted in the
public sphere of government, politics and commerce." Within the do-
mestic sphere, private power determines status relations between men
homosexuality, whether imposed by the state or social discrimination tolerated by the state,
buttress traditional categories of masculine and feminine traits and preserve expectations of
how men and women behave in private life. See Law, supra note 6, at 209-11 ("The as-
sumption and prescription of heterosexuality is one important piece in the mosaic that gives
meaning to sexuality and to cultural concepts of gender."). Discrimination against sexual
minorities should be regarded as gender discrimination. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sis-
sies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex", "Gender", and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law & Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3, 117-28
(1995)(concluding that it is not meaningful to distinguish discrimination on the basis of sex,
gender or sexual orientation). The U.N. Human Rights Committee in Toonen v. Australia
suggested that for purposes of the prohibition against sex discrimination in article 2, para-
graph 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the term "sex" included sexual
orientation. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 488, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992
(1994). See generally ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
144-49 (1995); Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human
Rights, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, 65-67, 74-77(1996) (discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is gender discrimination); James D. Wilets, Using International Law to Vindicate
the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians in United States Courts, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 33, 36-39 (1995) (international law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation).
42. See STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY No. 25 (ASIL); Hilary Charles-
worth, The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in International Law, 12
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1992); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright,
Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); Frances E. Ol-
sen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, in
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157-89 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer
ed., 1993); Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 86-110 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994); Shelley Wright, Economic Rights, Social Justice and the State: A Feminist Reap-
praisal, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-36 (Dorinda
G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993). For a broader discussion of the public/private distinction in inter-
national law, see Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. INT'L. L.J.
149, 155-164 (1988).
43. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982).
44. See generally JOAN WILLIAMS; UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (1999); NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MOD-
ERN FEMINISM (1987); Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18
MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985).
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and women, husbands and wives, and fathers and mothers. The state
rarely exercises public power over these private relations. The state
limits its roles primarily to the division of property rights and the cus-
tody of children.
Most societies generally regard women as "the repositories, guardi-
ans, and transmitters of culture." 5 When women assert their autonomy,
they may be seen as threatening the reproduction of culture and thus
society's survival. 6 Third World societies, in particular, often measure
western cultural influence in terms of its effect on women.47 In these
societies, modernization has often been accepted in almost every respect
except with regard to traditional gender roles.4 '8 As globalization causes
economic and social dislocation in both the industrialized and develop-
ing countries, societies sense profound cultural changes, and there is a
concomitant pressure to defend culture by preserving traditional gender
roles .49
One of the striking characteristics of the debate over the universal-
ism of women's rights has been the willingness of even human rights
advocates and feminist legal scholars to concede that gender norms im-
plicate culture and may be subject to a cultural exception. ° Scholars
have been concerned particularly with cultural exceptions to the rights
45. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Dis-
course, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 167,
169 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
46. See id. at 169-172. See also Romany, supra note 42, at 85-96.
47. For example, modernization in Arab Societies has sparked a deep social struggle
over gender roles. The elite class generally favors expanding educational and career oppor-
tunities for women, but at the same time, post-colonial Arab nationalists resist westernizing
women. Nationalist elites expect women to modernize and respect traditional Arab patriar-
chy. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab
Societies, in FEMINISM AND ISLAM: LITERARY AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Mai Yamani, ed.
1996).
48. Men in postcolonial societies often adapt rapidly to modern western cultural forms,
while women may be expected to remain faithful to more traditional cultural norms. See
UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS, AND THIRD-WORLD
FEMINISM 17-27 (1997) (discussing inter alia how Indian men readily westernize clothing,
while Indian women still maintain traditional dress).
49. Id. The pattern of defending traditional gender roles may be characteristic of periods
of modernization. For example, Nancy Cott has shown how during the early period of in-
dustrialization (1780-1830) in New England profound social transformations created an
expectation of "domesticity" that reaffirmed the traditional place of women in the home.
"Thus women's self-renunciation was called upon to remedy men's self-alienation." NANCY
F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: WOMEN'S SPHERE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835
63-100 (1977).
50. For a good overview of the debate over cultural relativism and women's rights, see
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., 1994); and OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanna Kerr
ed., 1993).
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of women in Third World countries." Human rights scholars routinely
single out the CEDAW as requiring "invasive state action" that endan-
gers individual rights, cultural attitudes, and religious beliefs.12 Most
scholars accept that culture contextualizes the norm of gender equality,
which, unlike other human rights norms, expands or contracts as a
function of culture.53 One human rights scholar concedes:
Many conflicts between women's human rights and religious
freedom involve norms that have not as yet been accorded over-
riding significance by the international community .... In such
situations of conflict, a balancing approach that takes into ac-
count particularized facts concerning the impact of the rights
involved on one another, and on the underlying principles of
gender equality and religious freedom, can provide a framework
for conflict resolution.54
Human rights advocates accept the argument that gender discrimi-
nation is a private domestic matter beyond the reach of international
human rights law.55 Even among human rights advocates who reject the
51. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 9 (arguing for culturally sensitive universal rights); Mi-
chael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998)
(criticizing cultural relativism as deterministic and tautological); Simon S.C. Tay, Human
Rights, Culture and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L. J. 743 (1996) (examining the
problematic character of the cultural argument in the context of Asian human rights); Ab-
dullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to
Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167-88 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (states have a responsi-
bility to remove cultural and religious barriers to women's rights); Adetoun 0. llumoka,
African Women's Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights-Towards A Relevant Theory and
Practice, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
308-25 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994)(the women's rights movement is for privileged western
women and may not be relevant for third world women); Florence Butegwa, Using the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to Secure Women's Access to Land in Africa, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 495-514
(Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994)(custom is the main barrier to women's access to land); Rao,
supra note 45, at 167-175 (women regularly suffer denials of human rights in the name of
culture); Sullivan, supra note 40, at 795 (proposing a framework for resolving conflict be-
tween traditional religious practices and the international norm of gender equality ).
52. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 62, 79 (1986).
53. For example, Noreen Burrows has argued that because of the diversity of forms of
family life, culture operates as a barrier to the recognition of women's rights. See Noreen Bur-
rows, International Law and Human Rights: The Case of Women's Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 80, 97 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986). See generally Rebecca J.
Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125
(1994) (states avoid responsibility for violations of women's rights, in part, by justifying viola-
tions as cultural practices).
54. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 821.
55. See Gaer, supra note 6, at 21-22. Since international law traditionally is only con-
cerned with state actors, discrimination or abuse by non-state actors has not been considered
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cultural exception, it is clear that there is a need to engage the cultural
argument in defense of gender equality. There is no analogous debate
over human rights, like freedom from torture or slavery. In this way,
gender equality seems embedded in the private sphere in which culture
operates rather than the public sphere in which, other political and civil
rights are located. The persistence of the public/private dichotomy mir-
rors both domestic law and the political realities of inter-state relations,
in which state actors have been less protective of women's rights than
other human rights. The next section explores the inter-state relations by
focusing on the U.N. conferences during the Decade for Women. At
these conferences, state representatives reinforced the idea that gender
equality is often viewed as subject to a cultural exception.
B. U.N. Debates on Cultural Relativism
The debate over the universality of women's rights has been re-
flected in the development of the U.N. instruments on women's rights
arising out of the U.N. Decade for Women and the subsequent related
conferences at Cairo, Vienna and Beijing. During the U.N. Decade for
Women (1975-1985) the United Nations focused attention on gender
inequality at international conferences in Mexico City, Copenhagen, and
Nairobi. Each of these conferences led to a final instrument that reaf-
firmed various aspects of women's rights. Significantly, each of these
documents recognized the central role of women in family and society,
rather than in government or commerce. The 1975 Mexico City Declara-
tion on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development
and Peace stressed the equality of women within family and society, the
right to choose one's spouse, and the right to decide whether to bear chil-
dren.56 The 1980 Copenhagen Final Document focused on "not only legal
equality, ... but also equality of rights, responsibilities and opportunities
for the participation of women in development."57 At Copenhagen, for the
first time in a U.N. forum, the delegates recognized that violence against
women and children was a legitimate concern of the international com-
munity." The Secretary-General of the conference had urged delegates
a subject of international law. State responsibility for protecting women from discrimination
or violence was ignored even by human rights advocates. For example, until recently Am-
nesty International would not investigate reports of violence against women by non-
governmental actors. See id. at 21. Amnesty decided in December 1997, following the Bei-
jing Conference, to expand its focus to include the failure of governments to stop the abuse
of women. See id. at 21-22.
56. See id. at 13.
57. Id. (citing the Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for
Women: Equality, Development, and Peace, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.94/35 (1980)).
58. See id.
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not to raise the issue of violence against women because she believed it
was a western issue that would not be recognized by Third World coun-
tries. 9 In fact, since the Copenhagen Conference, the right of women to
be free from violence has become a more important issue for Third
World human rights advocates. 60 The 1985 Nairobi Conference on
Women asserted the right of women "to exercise effectively their rights
in matters pertaining to population concerns, including the basic right to
control their own fertility.",6' The conference called on governments to
protect the rights of women in minority populations while respecting the
cultural rights of these groups.62
The U.N. 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights was
preceded by a series of regional preparatory conferences ("prepcoms")
in Tunis, Algeria, San Jose, Costa Rica, and Bangkok, Thailand. 6' These
prepcoms exhibited intense cultural resistance to women's rights. For
example, at the Bangkok prepcom, some of the Asian representatives
criticized the claim of universality of women's rights and asserted that
women's rights were subordinated to cultural and religious practices. 64
In response to this cultural resistance, a meeting of non-governmental
organizations issued a declaration rejecting cultural exceptions to
women's rights and criticizing religious extremism aimed at women.65
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna marked a
significant development in international women's rights. The Confer-
ence recognized the importance of protecting women's rights as a
central plank in the international human rights platform. 66 In particular,
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action treated violence
against women as a denial of human rights.67 At the Conference dele-
gates from Europe and the United States challenged the use of culture
and religion to deny women equality. The Vienna Declaration stressed:
[T]he importance of working towards the elimination of vio-
lence against women in public and private life, the elimination
of all forms of sexual harassment, exploitation and trafficking in
women, the elimination of gender bias in the administration of
justice and the eradication of any conflicts which may arise
between the rights of women and the harmful effects of certain
59. See id.
60. See id. at 19.
61. Id. at 14.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 27.
64. See id. at 30.
65. See Gaer, supra note 6, at 29-30. See generally Engle, supra note 9, at 311-16.
66. See id. at 32.
67. See id.
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traditional or customary practices, cultural prejudices and re-
68ligious extremism.
The Vienna Conference framed the conflict between the rights of
women and culture. By focusing on "harmful" cultural practices,
"cultural prejudices and religious extremism," the delegates sought to
distinguish between "authentic" cultural and religious values and
"extremism." The implication then was that only extremist cultural and
religious practices were suspect. 69 The Conference could not resolve the
underlying conflict between women's rights advocates and defenders of
cultural exceptions.
This conflict re-emerged vividly in the subsequent International
Conference on Population and Development at Cairo. There, the Holy
See joined with some delegations from certain Islamic countries to op-
pose abortion, extramarital relations, and homosexuality 0 The final
document recognized that the right of women to control reproduction
was essential for the success of any population planning program. How-
ever, it provided that the implementation of its recommendations "is the
sovereign right of each country, consistent with full respect for the vari-
ous religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its
people."'"
At the Cairo Conference two strategies emerged for resisting gender
equality. First, the Cairo Conference endorsed the position that culture
and religion were legitimate considerations in determining a woman's
access to birth control;7 2 states could restrict such access based on cul-
tural or religious values. This language represented a compromise
between the United States, on the one hand, and Egypt and the Holy
See, on the other. While the Holy See's primary concern was the issue
of birth control, particularly abortion, it became clear at the U.N. Con-
ference on Women at Beijing that the cultural question had larger
implications. Second, some Third World delegations tried to link the
68. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human
Rights, art. 38, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157/23 (1993).
69. See Donna J. Sullivan, Women's Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 157-58 (1994).
70. See Mona Zulficar, From Human Rights to Program Reality: Vienna, Cairo, and
Beijing in Perspective, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1017, 1027-28 (1995).
71. Report of the International Conference on Population & Development, at Chapter
II, U. N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994).
72. For a contrary argument that states may not assert religion as basis for not according
women equal rights, see Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism
to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United Nations Char-
ter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 271 (1997) (the U.N. Charter required that race, sex and
religious discrimination be treated equally and that the Charter prohibited a religious-based
objection to upholding the human rights of women.)
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issue of substantive gender equality with sexual orientation. By joining
the rights of women and sexual minorities, the Holy See and certain de-
veloping countries hoped to stiffen resistance to gender equality.
Both of these strategies were evidenced during the regional prep-
coms leading up to the Beijing Conference. Many delegations
acknowledged the importance of overcoming cultural barriers to the full
equality of women, but at the same time strong opposition emerged
from a number of Third World countries.73 At the New York global
prepcom, several Latin American delegations objected to the use of the
term "gender. 74 They alleged that western feminists were employing
"gender" as a Trojan Horse to expand the rights of homosexuals and
transsexuals.75 These delegations argued that recognizing the rights of
sexual minorities was inconsistent with their cultural and religious val-
ues.76 One Latin American Archbishop charged that feminists were
promoting "unnatural genders" to "destroy family and moral values."77
The debate at the Beijing Conference focused on the universality of
women's rights and the question whether culture should trump gender
equality." Delegations from Malta, China, India, Cuba, Egypt, and the
Holy See, among others, objected to language affirming the universality
of women's rights and sought to qualify this language by reference to
cultural differences.79 The Beijing Declaration in its preamble stated,
"[w]omen's rights are human rights."80 Yet, the Beijing Platform for
Action reiterated the language of the Cairo conference that suggested
women's rights were culturally determined. The Platform declared that
the implementation of these rights was subject to "the significance of
and full respect for various religious and ethical values, cultural back-
grounds and philosophical convictions of individuals and their
communities."8' Further, the Platform stressed the centrality of religious
belief and practices and provided that to achieve gender equality, "there
73. See Gaer, supra note 6, at 41-54.
74. See id. at 44-46.
75. See id. at 46.
76. See id. See also Gregory M. Saylin, The United Nations International Conference
on Population and Development: Religion, Tradition and Law in Latin America, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1245 (the First World should not use the United Nations to impose feminist
values on Latin American culture and religion).
77. Gaer, supra note 6, at 46 (citing THE VATICAN AND THE FOURTH WORLD CONFER-
ENCE ON WOMEN: DISTORTION OF THE DRAFT PLATFORM FOR ACTION (Catholics for a Free
Choice)).
78. See id. at 51-53.
79. See Gaer, supra note 6, at 51-53.
80. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of the United Nations Fourth World
Conference on Women, Annex 1, 14, U. N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995).
81. Id. at Annex II, 9.
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is a need to respect these rights and freedoms fully."82 The outcome of
this discussion reaffirmed the idea that women's rights depend upon the
cultural context.
It is illuminating to compare the qualified language of the Beijing
Conference with the broader language of CEDAW.83 CEDAW imposed
on states a positive obligation to create substantive gender equality and
to remove cultural barriers to the advancement of women.8" The
CEDAW implicitly acknowledged the need to reform culture to secure
gender equality. The CEDAW obligated states to oppose cultural resis-
tance to the advancement of women's rights. 5 In response, a number of
the signatory states ratified the CEDAW with explicit reservations that
women's rights were subject to cultural and religious beliefs and prac-
tices.86 Certain countries, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Libya, and
Tunisia, explicitly invoked Islam as the basis for their objections."
These countries, among others, have laws that require wives to obey
their spouses, restrict the ability of women to work outside the home,
limit their freedom to marry, prevent women from inheriting property,
oblige women to hide their faces, arms and legs in public, deny women
educational opportunities, prevent women from practicing certain pro-
82. Id. at Annex II, [ 24.
83. See CEDAW, supra note 32.
84. See id. at art. 2
85. See id. at art. 5.
86. For example, Singapore's reservation stated: "In the context of Singapore's multi-
racial and multi-religious society and the need to respect the freedom of minorities to prac-
tice their religious and personal laws, the Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to
apply the provisions of articles 2 and 16 where compliance with these provisions would be
contrary to their religious or personal laws." Similar reservations have been entered by Al-
geria, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Maldives, among others. See Louis HENKIN, GERALD
NEUMAN, DIANE ORENTLICHER & DAVID LEEBRON, HUMAN RIGHTS 362-64 (1999). The
view of the Islamic law represented by these reservations has been contested. See generally
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 51, at 167-185. It is probably more accurate to
speak of these reservations by Islamic countries as "cultural" than as strictly religious.
Compared to all other human rights instruments, the CEDAW "has attracted the greatest
number of reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms
of the treaty." Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime on the Conven-
tion on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 317 (1991). Arguably, some
of these reservations may be deemed incompatible with the purposes of the CEDAW and
therefore, ineffective. The CEDAW provides in Art. 28(2) that "A reservation incompatible
with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall note be permitted." Moreover,
Art. 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not permit reservations that
are "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
87. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Women's Rights: Re-
flections on the Middle Eastern Experience, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 176, 177
(Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Akram Mirhosseini, After the Revolution: Vio-
lations of Women's Human Rights in Iran, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 72-77
(Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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fessions, including law, afford lesser weight to a woman's testimony in
court, deny women the right to travel unless accompanied by a male
family member, and prohibit women from driving.88 Other state parties
to CEDAW may have accepted the reservations of the Islamic countries
out of "cultural sensitivity." In fact, western countries yielded to an in-
terpretation of Islamic law that is highly contested within the Islamic
world,89 where there is substantial resistance by women to these laws.90
In sum, the U.N. Conferences at Cairo, Vienna, and Beijing demon-
strated the centrality of the conflict between international women's
rights and some set of beliefs and practices posited as culture. Each of
these conferences explicitly focused on the role of women within the
family, rather than the contribution of women to the public sector. The
debates and the documents produced by these conferences and the re-
gional prepcoms evidence a move toward accommodating cultural
concerns as a strategy for achieving diplomatic consensus. The need to
address cultural concerns and the willingness to compromise the inter-
national rights of women reflected the intensity of cultural resistance to
gender equality. In this context, states deployed the rhetoric of culture
successfully to limit the expansion of global governance.
C. Female Genital Cutting
One of the most vivid examples of cultural resistance to women's
rights concerns the Third World practice of female genital cutting.9'
Supporters have defended female genital cutting as an essential cultural
88. Id.
89. See Venkatraman, supra note 38, at 2011 (concluding that the CEDAW is consis-
tent with the Shari'a and rejecting criticism of women's rights by Islamic clerics as the
"corrupt application of Islamic principles and incorrect interpretation of Islamic precepts for
political expediency and social entrenchment.").
90. See generally LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF
A MODERN DEBATE (1992); Mayer, supra note 88, at 179-183; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im,
supra note 51, at 169-170, 177.
91. See Anna Funder, De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3
TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 417 (1993) (female circumcision represents patriarchal
social structure and cannot be justified by patriarchal culture.); Note, What's Culture Got to
Do With It?: Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1944 (1993)[hereinafter "What's Culture Got to Do With It?"]. I am using the term "female
genital cutting" to refer to several traditional forms of female genital mutilation or circumci-
sion, including clitoridectomy, excision and infibulation, among others, which are widely
practiced throughout Africa. See Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female Genital Cut-
ting (FGC), paper prepared by the Office of the Senior Coordinator for International
Women's Issues, Bureau for Global Affairs and the Office of Asylum Affairs, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Jan. 15, 1999. For a more
explicit description of the practice, see MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF
RADICAL FEMINISM 166 (1978).
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practice.92 For example, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta argued, "the
moral code of the tribe is bound up with this custom and that it symbol-
izes the unification of the whole tribal organization."93 Some women
have suggested that female genital cutting may be consistent with hu-
man rights within a particular cultural context.9' Others have argued that
in thinking about genital cutting we cannot ignore the cultural values of
Third World women. 95 One African academic in the United States has
attacked the "hypocrisy" of U.S. feminists:
The feminist critique seeks to redeem women's voices and re-
alities from the eclipsing of male controlled social discourses
and institutions. [note omitted] Insisting that no one community
of norms is astute enough to trump the variegated values and
standards of human experience, feminists argue that the white
male ideal marginalizes, disempowers and renders the "other"
invisible ....
Nevertheless, whether out of arrogance or fear of fracturing the
base for mobilization, feminism manifests a tendency that be-
trays the partiality of its makers and entertains a party line that
muzzles the merits of voices that do not simply echo the main-
stream sentiments ... Even if sincere, the assumption highlights
the hypocrisy inherent in professing high-sounding principles of
global sisterhood and the politics of experience, while meting
92. See generally L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275
(1997).
93. Rao, supra note 45, at 170 (citing JoMo KENYATA, FACING MT. KENYA: THE
TRIBAL LIFE OF THE GIKUYU (1953)).
94. See Kay Boulware-Miller, Female Circumcision: Challenges to the Practice as a
Human Rights Violation, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 155 (1985) (criticizes western feminist
arguments against female circumcision and explores an alternative culturally sensitive ap-
proach invoking a right to health); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-
Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: the Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1992); Alison Slack, Female Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal, 10
HUM. RTS. Q. 437 (1988) (examines whether a tradition of female circumcision may be re-
garded as a violation of human rights). Some feminists have conceded that point. Other
feminists have argued that in thinking about female circumcision we cannot ignore the cul-
tural values of third world women. See Hope Lewis, Between lrua and "Female Genital
Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. H. RTS. J.
1 (1995) (pointing out the need for more dialogue with Third World women who defend the
practice.) Cf Williams, supra note 44, at 263-268 ("feminist efforts to oppose FGC can
easily hurt more than help unless these efforts are conceptualized as alliances with local
feminists...").
95. See Lewis, supra note 94, at I (pointing out the need for more dialogue with Third
World women who defend the practice).
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out a double standard that reinstates the very silencing and
stigmatization of women that feminism challenges.96
In particular, some feminist writers have pointed out that some
young girls consent to be cut, and more often, mothers consent to, and
may even participate in, cutting their daughter.97 Critics "fail to consider
seriously the possibility that women are not all the same and that legiti-
mate differences might exist among them, particularly regarding issues
such as clitoridectomy. 98 In their view, it is arrogant and condescending
to impose western ideas about bodily autonomy on others or to disre-
gard the opinions of African mothers and girls as the product of "false
consciousness."9 9 In the alternative, some feminists have suggested that
instead of criticizing these practices we should "engage the exotic
other," and understand the practice of female genital cutting from the
perspective of these women.00
The willingness of some feminists to defend female genital cutting,
or at least, to try to understand it in a cultural context, is itself revealing
of the way that culture has shaped the discourse of women's rights. We
could argue with equal conviction that genital cutting is not entitled to
any greater deference than the practice of slavery in North Africa, seg-
regation in the United States, anti-semitism in central Europe or the
conditions of prisons or poor houses in nineteenth-century Britain.'0 ' In
each example, we choose to endow some practices with the veneer of
"culture," while the others are merely "archaic" or barbaric. Even more
fundamentally, the underlying assumption here is that feminism is a
western idea transplanted to the Third World. Implicitly, this assump-
tion denies the continuous struggle of Third World women for greater
dignity within their own societies. The resistance of Third World
women has been dismissed as the product of foreign influence, when in
fact, their opposition is just as culturally authentic as is the support for
genital cutting.'l 2
96. Obiora, supra note 92, at 311-12 (female genital cutting should be preserved, but
regulated, out of respect for cultural identity).
97. See Boulware-Miller, supra note 94, at 156-58.
98. Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the
Exotic Other Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (1992). Engle points out that critics
of female genital cutting are unwilling to acknowledge the extent to which culture is an ob-
stacle to eliminating the practice or the degree to which women have consented to it. See id.
at 1519-20.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1512. See also Gunning, supra note 94, at 198-204.
101. See What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 91, at 1957-61.
102. See NARAYAN, supra note 48, at 29-39.
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D. The Norm of Gender Equality and the Third World
The international community has acknowledged the importance of
gender equality, yet by continuing to defer to culture, it excludes
women from the reach of public international law. The assumption that
gender equality is culturally dependent is embedded in the discourse of
gender equality.
There are three responses to efforts to universalize women's rights.
First, some Third World scholars accuse Western feminists of
"essentializing" women.' 3 The anti-essentialist argument is often
framed as a conflict between feminism and culture.'0 Anti-essentialist
arguments do not necessarily reject feminism or deny that gender
equality may represent a universal value that transcends cultural
boundaries. 5 Some anti-essentialist arguments simply assert that gender
equality should be viewed within a particular ethnic or national context.
In other words, anti-essentialism tends to emphasize culture over gen-
der. Some anti-essentialists may see this shift in emphasis as a
pragmatic-political strategy to gain support for gender equality. Other
may see it as a recognition of post-colonialism and an effort to differen-
tiate local culture from dominant western culture. Implicitly, by
focusing their critique on gender equality, anti-essentialists reinforce the
idea that other rights-the right to contract, property, political partici-
pation, or legal process-do transcend borders without regard for
culture. These rights may also be gendered in the sense that they pri-
marily reference men, who are engaged in the public realm of
commerce, politics, and law.' °6
A second response is that feminists are imposing western liberal
values on other societies without regard for historical and cultural dif-
ferences.' °7 Some advocates for the Third World have rejected claims for
gender equality as a universal human right as a form of cultural imperi-
103. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics
of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1581-82 (1996) ("Cultural feminists devel-
oped the modem construct, 'woman' by privileging sex differences over any other basis of
oppression and time and space. [note omitted] This version of feminism has been criticized
as gender essentialism.") See also, Harris, supra note 15 (the dominant white culture essen-
tializes women because of a lack of understanding of the experience of minority women).
104. See Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us, 129
DAEDALUS 125 (2000) (Professor Minnow characterizes this conflict as between the liberal,
who defends individual women against group oppression, and the cultural defender, who
rejects cultural imperialism and embraces group identity).
105. For a more nuanced view of this conflict, see Leti Volpp, Multiculturalism Versus
Feminism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2001).
106. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 42, at 625-27.
107. See Gunning, supra note 94, at 190-191.
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alism.' °8 Even some feminists express concern that women's rights may
represent liberal western cultural biases:
In addition to these concerns for the inherent bias within inter-
national law against non-western cultures and women whatever
their cultural background, the law generally also implies pun-
ishment and even forcible change. Even if one can inject a
multicultural perspective and set of values into the law, how can
mutual respect be maintained if the 'losing' cultural value can
be punished or even forced to change?'09
This argument appeals to the West's sense of moral responsibility for
the history of colonialism. A refined version of this argument is that
Third World objections to universal human rights norms offer a differ-
ent universal norm, rather than denying any norm. When Islamic
countries raise objections to women working with men, we could per-
ceive those objections as presenting an alternative view of women's
rights rather than as a denial of gender equality.1 °
Ironically, by invoking culture in this connection, defenders of
Third World countries are appropriating the same rhetoric once used to
rationalize and legitimate colonialism. Whereas the Europeans refer-
enced "high culture" as compensation for exploitation, subsequent
generations of anthropologists have referenced Third World "culture,"
as a mark of underdevelopment and dependency. Why do we identify
certain conduct as cultural? How we deploy the term itself reveals cer-
tain underlying value preferences. For example, by characterizing
certain individual behavior, such as domestic violence, as cultural, we
attribute certain bad acts to whole groups of people. We often label
conduct as cultural when it performed by a member of a racial or ethnic
minority or a developing nation. When a member of the majority in the
United States or Europe commits the same conduct, we typically blame
the individual and not the culture. This labeling tends to exaggerate eth-
nic differences and supports the idea that white European culture is
superior."' Contrasting western liberalism with Third World culture re-
affirms the existing status relations between the industrialized and
108. See, e.g., Pheng Cheah, Posit(ion)ing Human Rights in the Current Global Con-
juncture, 9 PUBLIC CULTURE 233 (1997).
109. Gunning, supra note 94, at 193 (applying a culturally specific analysis to the
question of female circumcision).
110. See Catherine Powell, Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 208-15 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal
Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 311-12 (1999).
111. See Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89
(2000).
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developing states by implying that certain states are not sufficiently
mature to assume responsibility for respecting women's rights.
Moreover, the cultural imperialism argument reifies certain histori-
cal and cultural distinctions and suggests that they should not be subject
to foreign influence. This presumes that culture is static and bounded by
the geography of sovereign states. One response to this argument is that
national culture is an artificial social construct. Third World states are
themselves the creation of western liberal ideology mapped onto the
Third World. Imperialism produced Third World nationalism and sov-
ereignty. The borders drawn by colonial powers do not determine the
culture of Third World states. Family, tribe, village, religion, and com-
merce shape culture. These sources of culture cross and divide national
borders. Which of these cultural influences is any more authentic than
the views of women resisting gender inequality within Third World so-
cieties?"2
More ominously, by juxtaposing national culture against women's
rights, Third World advocates subordinate Third World women to the
private exercise of male privilege."3 Assertions of national culture may
overlook sub-cultures or groups that do not willingly submit to the na-
tional culture."14 By appealing to cultural generalizations in defense of
112. See Binder, supra note 9 (challenging the idea that culture is bounded by the na-
tion state and arguing that state itself is an invention of western culture). See generally
Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149
(1997).
113. See Ayelet Shachar, Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law: The Per-
ils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J. OF POL. PHIL. 285 (1998) (reliance on rigid
multicultural approach privileges ethnic group rights over women); Susan Moller Okin, Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, BOSTON REV. (1999), at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/
BR22.5/okin.html (showing how minority cultures often gain recognition of group rights at
the expense of minority women).
114. The relationship between cultural claims and women's rights has also been evi-
dent in U.S. domestic law. Increasingly, cultural defenses have been brought successfully in
criminal trials in which the victim was a woman. In particular, Asian-American men who
have assaulted or killed Asian-American women have argued cultural defenses. The cultural
defense operates to maintain the subordination of Asian-American women in their traditional
culture. See Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense,"
17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994) (the cultural defense should be balanced by an antisubor-
dination principle that recognizes both the subordination of immigrant cultures and the
subordination of immigrant women within those cultures). For example, a Chinese-American
man killed his spouse and was acquitted of murder after arguing that Chinese custom allows
husbands to kill unfaithful wives in order to relieve the husband of shame. See Cathy Young,
Equal Cultures-or Equality?, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1992, at C5; Myrna Oliver, Immigrant
Crimes: Cultural Defense-A Legal Tactic, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1988, at 1; Diana C. Chiu,
The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and a Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1053 (1994) (proposing that criminal defendants should be allowed to introduce a cul-
tural defense only to explain their state of mind); see generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman,
Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093 (1996) (cultural defenses should be barred in criminal trials); Nilda Rimonte, A
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Third World sovereignty, these advocates reinforce western stereotypes
of Third World countries as patriarchal, intolerant and undemocratic.
For example, the willingness to accept cultural justifications for the de-
nial of women's rights in Islamic cultures"5 may derive from western
stereotyping of "orientalism.""' 6 Westerners reinforce negative stereo-
types by explaining Third World cultural traditions in terms of the
subordination of women. In so doing, the sympathetic westerner echoes
the colonialist argument that pointed to the exploitation and abuse of
Third World women as evidence of the backwardness of their colo-
nies." 1
7
A third objection to a universal norm of gender equality is that cul-
tural exceptions to international legal norms are no more or less suspect
than domestic legal exceptions to international law. The objection here
rests on the idea that since culture is indeterminate, we can characterize
the arguments raised by the United States against international legal
norms as cultural just as we characterize the arguments of some Islamic
States as cultural. For example, when Islamic countries object to ex-
tending certain rights to women based on the Koran, we regard that as
cultural. Yet, if the United States objects to certain rights based on fed-
eralism concerns, we would characterize that objection is legal or
constitutional. One scholar has suggested that there is no significant
Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian
Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991) (Asian culture facili-
tates decriminalizing violence against Asian women). Typically, the crime has involved acts
by a Asian man against a woman. One critic of the cultural defense has charged:
In this paradigm, Asian American identity becomes predicated on adhering to
cultural traditions that were created by men; and that privilege men. In such an
equation, an attack on culture becomes an attack on male identity? Such bracket-
ing of gender to preserve culture essentializes the Asian American woman's
identity as a cultural caretaker and leaves Asian American women with frag-
mented selves. We can only exist as the essential Asian American women that
Asian American men want us to be.
Chiu, supra note 114, at 1124.
115. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Islamic Law, International Relations, and
Human Rights: Challenge and Response, 20 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 317 (1987) (questioning
the authority of certain interpretations of Islamic law that oppress women); Mayer, supra
note 4 (Islamic women have resisted interpretations of Islamic law imposed upon them by
political elites in Islamic countries). For an interesting discussion of the complex and often
contradictory ways in which Islamic women have resisted and subverted fundamentalism
through its own religious rhetoric and forms, see Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism
and the Veil: Considering the Differences, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1527 (1992).
116. See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1979)(Professor Said
shows how Europeans artificially constructed the category of 'orientalism' in ways that sub-
ordinated cultural differences, denied history, and maintained European hegemony).
117. See NARAVAN, supra note 48, at 17 (1997); AHMED, supra note 90. Ahmed shows
how the British characterized the veil as the suppression of Islamic women to legitimate
British imperialism. Id. at 152-53.
Fall 20001
Michigan Journal of International Law
distinction between constitutional arguments against CEDAW made by
the United States and cultural or religious arguments against the
CEDAW made by some Islamic countries."8 In this view, both the Con-
stitution and the Koran are sacred texts in their respective societies and
both could be viewed as cultural. This argument collapses the distinc-
tion between law and culture. If law is indistinguishable from culture,
then it makes no sense to talk about cultural exceptions to legal obliga-
tions.
In my view, this objection fails to acknowledge the real difference
between cultural arguments and legal arguments. Of course, law is both
a product and an instrument of culture, but it is distinguishable from
culture. When an Islamic state argues that religious dogma justifies its
treatment of women, it is asserting that the practice represents the
teaching of the Prophet or of God. By their nature, religious obligations
are immutable and are not subject to political processes. By contrast,
legal arguments are asserting only that the political process requires this
result. Legal outcomes are always subject to change either by statute,
constitutional amendment, or judicial interpretation. Law is about a very
specific discrete temporal process. Legal objections can be overcome by
changing the law. Culture and religion do change over time, but they are
much more difficult to change. No single event or process can transform
a cultural or religious belief.
The difficulty of changing culture reflects another basic difference:
culture is not readily identifiable. Within a society, there are many sub-
cultures that intersect. An Islamic woman may feel one set of cultural
norms are appropriate among her family, and a different set of norms
are appropriate among friends, classmates, or co-workers. To privilege
any one set of cultural norms is to subordinate some other set of norms.
There is no single authoritative voice for interpreting culture. Islamic
scholars disagree about what the Koran requires. The text might be
authoritative and fixed, but legal structures provide for authoritative
interpretation. When a constitutional obligation is raised to an interna-
tional legal obligation, we can debate the legal arguments and
eventually reach a consensus, change the Constitution, or receive an
authoritative interpretation from a court of law.
In the final analysis, these three objections to the universality of
gender equality-the anti-essentialist objection, the cultural imperialist
objection, and the cultural indeterminacy objection-do not explain
why gender norms are subject to cultural arguments while other human
rights norms are accepted as universal.
118. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations
to CEDA W, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 739 (1996).
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E. Conclusion
The question to pursue is why we respect some customary practices
concerning gender and sexuality as "culture," and therefore, regard
them as beyond the reach of international human rights norms. What
accounts for the omnipresence of culture in discussions about women's
rights and the relative absence of a cultural component in discussions
about other human rights?
Let us consider five possible explanations for why culture is a rele-
vant exception to women's rights, but not other human rights. First, one
could argue that respect for human rights progresses slowly. The devel-
opment of human rights norms lags behind social consciousness. We
first condemn religious intolerance, then slavery, then other forms of
racism, and only later does society reject sexism and homophobia. In
institutional terms, the international structures for promoting the rights
of women are relatively new and still weak. In time, we might expect to
see more support for gender equality and the creation of international
institutions for enforcing such rights. As an empirical matter, this de-
scription of social progress may be accurate, but it has no normative
content. It does not explain why gender equality should be culturally
dependent. Nor does it explain why gender inequality must be addressed
at a later stage of human rights.
A second possible explanation is that the question turns on the defi-
nition of culture. Arguably, gender is culturally constructed in a way
that it is impossible to talk about gender rights divorced from culture.
That explanation is appealing, but it still begs the question. Certainly,
slavery is well established for a long historical period among a certain
class of persons in northern Africa. Persons born into slavery in north-
ern Africa may even regard themselves as property.' 9 Slavery is no less
culturally constructed than any form of gender subordination, but we do
not excuse it.
119. For example, after five centuries, slavery remains prevalent in Mauritania, where
an estimated 300,000 Africans are owned as chattel slaves, and Islamic leaders assert that the
Koran outlaws abolition. See Elinor Burkett, God Created Me to Be a Slave, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1997, section 6 (Magazine), page 56. Slavery is deeply rooted in the culture of Af-
rica and elsewhere. Modem forms of slavery include chattel slavery (in Sudan and
Mauritania), serfdom, forced labor (especially in China), debt bondage throughout the Third
World, migrant workers (in the Americas), prostitution and sexual slavery (in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), forced marriage and the sale of wives (in
Europe, North Africa, Asia and Latin America), and child labor (in Africa and Asia). See
generally Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Report of the Working Group on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Forth Session, U.N. ESCOR Comm. Oh Hum. Rts., Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 51st Sess.,
Agenda Item 6, para. 35-52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/7 (1999).
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Another explanation could be that states are unwilling to consent to
women's rights in the absence of a cultural escape clause. Certainly, as
a description of reality, that explanation seems compelling. For example
The Holy See, Singapore, and Iran were unwilling to sign the Final In-
strument of the Beijing Conference without some assurance that cultural
exceptions were valid bases for derogating from the rights guaranteed to
women. Why, however, did other states find the logic of this argument
compelling? South Africa practiced apartheid, but other states did not
agree that substantive racial equality was merely a cultural norm. This
rationalization does not explain why other state actors and scholars ac-
cept the premise that women's rights are culturally specific.
A fourth explanation for subordinating women's rights to cultural
exceptions is that the rights of women and sexual minorities contravene
deeply held moral and religious beliefs of some groups. Arguably, the
cultural exception here really is a religious or moral exception that the
international community acknowledges out of religious tolerance. States
generally impose certain moral or religious values on their citizens, for
example, by prohibiting murder. Many of the rights contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Covenants on
Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights are not uni-
versally enforced, but they are universally acknowledged, even though
some of them may contravene the religious and moral values and prac-
tices of some countries.'20 No one seriously argues a moral exemption to
impose a caste system, even though some societies and religious groups
have traditionally recognized such practices. Certainly some religious
groups are offended by contemporary art, but it is not regarded as a jus-
tifiable reason for not complying with the international norms that
respect free expression and access to culture. Some religions deny their
own children access to an education, but international law does not rec-
ognize a religious exemption to the exercise of that right.' It is
inconceivable that the international community would ever permit any
country to invoke a religious exemption for slavery, even though slav-
ery is mentioned in both the Old Testament and the Koran and is widely
120. These include rights like prohibitions against discriminating on the basis or race,
religion or caste (Decl. Art. 2), involuntary servitude (Decl. Art. 4), corporal and capital
punishment (Decl. Art.3, 4 and 5), interfering with the freedom to worship (Decl. Art. 18),
impeding the free flow of information and ideas (Decl. Art. 19), limiting participation in
government and voting (Decl. Art. 20), restricting the right to work and to choose one's job
(Decl. Art. 23), and denying education (Dec. Art. 26) or free access to enjoy the arts. (Decl.
Art. 27).
121. But cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972) (the State's interest in
compulsory education was insufficient to justify impinging on the free exercise of religion
by the Old Order Amish, which objected to high school education for their children).
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practiced in some countries. 22 Yet, when Third World women are de-
nied birth control, education, careers, property, freedom of movement,
and suffer physical and emotional abuse, the international community
defers to the cultural and religious sensibilities of these countries. The
argument for a cultural exception to human rights is unpersuasive if it is
only applicable to women and sexual minorities.
One other justification might be that matters that relate to gender,
family or sexuality are "private" and therefore outside the scope of in-
ternational law. However, as discussed above, the boundaries between
the public and private realms are socially constructed, and sometimes,
law crosses those boundaries. For example, the state intrudes upon the
"privacy" of the family when it enforces marital laws, distributes prop-
erty, or determines the custody of a child. The wall between what is
private and what is public is permeable and moveable. The response to
this argument is that gender equality is not intrinsically public or pri-
vate. The real question is always why do we choose to put gender on the
private side of that divide?
None of these arguments persuasively explains why the interna-
tional community persists in viewing gender norms as "cultural," when
other human rights are not viewed as cultural; nor does it explain the
willingness of state actors and legal scholars to condition the norm of
gender equality on cultural circumstances. The cultural relativity of
gender equality is difficult to defend in contrast to the absolute status of
other human rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the U.N.
Covenants. This paradox becomes more puzzling when we compare
women's rights to other international legal norms. What we find is that
international economic law and international environmental law regu-
larly conflict with important cultural and even moral values; yet, the
122. See Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its
Twenty-first Session, 1996, U.N. ESCOR, Hu. Rts. Comm., Sub-comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 48th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 15, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/24 (1996). Slavery is flourishing in the Sudan. See Ian Fisher,
Selling Sudan's Slaves into Freedom, Apr. 25, 1999, N.Y. TIMES, at AI0. Worldwide traffic
in slavery generates some $6 billion annually. See U.N. Economic Alternatives to Illicit Drug
Cultivation, Trafficking Must Be Created, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 19, 1998 (Statement of Pino
Arlacchi, Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Pre-
vention); See generally Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Seventh Session; First Session of the Board of Trustees
of the Voluntary Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1996/85 (1995); A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evo-
lution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the Slave Trade under Customary International Law,
39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303, 305-08 (1999)(noting that customary international law prohibits
slavery despite its prevalence in the contemporary world).
Fall 2000]
Michigan Journal of International Law
international community generally does not acknowledge these claims
as implicating culture.
In the sections following on international trade law and international
environmental law, we will see how cultural exceptions are routinely
dismissed. In the final section, we will explore possible explanations for
reconciling the apparently different treatment accorded to culture in the
context of gender equality, trade and environmental law.
III. CULTURAL EXCEPTIONS TO FREE TRADE
A. The Norm of Nondiscriminatory Open Trade
International trade in goods and services directly impacts every per-
son in a society. What we consume and what we produce are determined
in large part by the forces of the global marketplace. If foreign imports
displace a domestic industry, it certainly affects the life of the commu-
nity around that industry; if foreign imports introduce us to new tastes,
experiences and ideas, that too affects the way we live. Despite the ap-
parent connection between trade and social life, the international
community does not generally acknowledge that trade norms implicate
culture. State actors and legal scholars in general do not recognize cul-
tural exceptions to international trade norms, unlike international norms
of gender equality.
Before exploring the reasons for the disparate treatment of cultural
exceptions, it is useful to understand the broad requirements of the in-
ternational trading system known as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).'23 Article I of GATT prohibited contracting parties
("member states") 24 from discriminating among imported goods from
other member states. 2 1 Member states must accord "most-favored-nation
treatment" to imports from any other member state. Most-favored-nation
treatment means that a GATT member state cannot discriminate among
member states for purposes of levying tariffs and imposing other import
regulations. If the European Union allows the unrestricted sale of Cana-
dian videos, they must allow the unrestricted sale of U.S. videos. Most-
favored-nation treatment generalizes trade concessions so that the net
123. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 31, 1947, 55 O.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATI]. See generally TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 10.
124. Strictly speaking, GATT is not an organization, and therefore the parties to the
agreement are not "member states." However, since the creation of the World Trade Organi-
zation ("W.T.O") in 1994, all GATT contracting parties, with the exception of China (whose
membership is impending), have become member states of the W.T.O. To avoid confusion I
will use the term "member state" to refer to both the GATT and the W.T.O.
125. See GATT, supra note 123, at art. I.
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effect is to lower trade barriers. For example, the United States might
negotiate with Japan to lower the tariff on U.S. cassette discs imported
to Japan to three percent from ten percent. In exchange, the United
States might grant to Japan greater access to the U.S. telecommunica-
tions market. Now, Japan must accord the same tariff concessions to
E.U. cassette discs that it accords to U.S. cassette discs, even if the
Europeans offer Japan nothing in return. Article II of GATT provided
that once a concession is offered it cannot be withdrawn.' 26 If Canada
lowers a tariff on paper products, it cannot subsequently raise the tariff
without the consent of all the affected members of GATT.127 Article III
of GATT ensured that once an imported good enters a territory, it is
treated the same as the equivalent domestic product. 28 If the European
Union does not restrict the distribution of French videos, it may not
restrict the sale of U.S. videos. Finally, Article XI of the GATT pro-
hibited almost all quantitative restrictions on imported goods. 29 For
example, a ban on imported automotive parts would violate Article
XI. These four articles constitute the basic norm of nondiscriminatory
open trade that governs virtually all trade in tangible goods, with cer-
tain limited exceptions, among the 140 GATT member states. The
norm of nondiscriminatory open trade encourages import competition
with domestic goods at prices that reflect the actual cost of produc-
tion. In this way, nondiscrimination facilitates comparative advantage,
yielding both production and consumption gains.'"0
Some cultural commodities may be considered goods while others
are considered services. Cultural goods would include tangible articles
of trade like videos, books, and sound recordings. Cultural services
would include intangible products like broadcasts, film and video distri-
bution rights, and contracts for live artistic performances. The GATI
negotiations known as the "Uruguay Round" in 1994 extended the gen-
eral principles of GATT to services.' 3 ' The General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) applied most-favored-nation status and national
treatment to international trade in services.' Services were defined in
the GATS as "any service in any sector except services supplied in the
126. See id. at art. II.
127. See id.
128. See id. at art. III.
129. See id. at art. XI.
130. See generally STEPHEN COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, LAWS, AND ISSUES 56-69 (1 st ed. 1996).
131. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 10, at 225-236.
132. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994),
at arts. II, XVI and XVII [hereinafter GATS].
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exercise of governmental authority."'33 While GATS imposed a broad
obligation not to discriminate against imported services, the guarantee
of national treatment did not take immediate effect in all service sec-
tors."' GATS required each member state to accord national treatment
only to those services that the member state inscribed in its schedule for
liberalization.' GATS obligated each member state to negotiate a
schedule of specific commitments to progressive liberalization of serv-
ices with other member states. These negotiations will continue through
at least 2001.136
GATT and GATS formed an international norm of nondiscrimina-
tory open trade. There are important exceptions to this norm. Many
developing countries do not strictly adhere to the norm'37 and are al-
lowed to retain certain preferences.' Other preferential trading
133. Id. at art. I(3)(b).
134. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 10, at 233-35.
135. GATS, supra note 132, at art. XVII(1).
136. Id. at art. XIX. The European Union and its member states have adopted numerous
and far-reaching audiovisual policies, which may create barriers to U.S. distribution of tele-
vision broadcasting, films and videos. See generally Council Directive 97/36/EC, 1997 O.J.
(L262) 60; Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Soci-
ety, 1998 O.J. (C108) 6; Directive on Advanced Television Services; Green Paper on
Advertising and Sponsorship, COM(96)121; Directive on Comparative and Misleading Ad-
vertising, 97/55/EC; MEDIA II Programme; Convention for the protection of the audiovisual
heritage. The E.U. Television without Frontiers Directive of 1989 required that where practi-
cal at least fifty percent of all television broadcasting should be produced in Europe. The
Europeans asserted that local content objectives for television programming were compatible
with an implied cultural exception under the GATT or GATS. In addition, the Europeans
also argued that television programming could be exempt from the GATT under the "cinema
exception" of GATT Article IV. See generally Donaldson, supra note 2. The United States
and the European Union after prolonged negotiations failed to agree on the status of audio-
visual services. The practical result was to freeze in place the Television Directive. The
European Union permitted some U.S. firms to form joint ventures with European firms to co-
produce programs for European television. See generally, Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schim-
mel, The Cultural Exception: Does it Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it
Affect of is it Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS? 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281
(1997) (concluding that there is no cultural exception in the GATS). As of March 2000, the
European Union and the United States have not reached agreement on liberalizing audiovis-
ual services. Although the Europeans have pressed for an explicit cultural exception for
films, broadcasts and video, the parties did not agree to a cultural exception. Indeed, even
the European Commission has conceded that there is no cultural exception in the GATS for
audiovisual services. See Strategy Options to Strengthen the European Programme Industry
in the Context of the Audiovisual Policy of the European Union: Green Paper for the Com-
mission, COM(94) 29, adopted on April 7, 1994.
137. GATT allows developing countries broad latitude to take measures that are neces-
sary for development and conserving foreign exchange. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 123, at
art. XVIII (providing that developing countries "shall be free to deviate temporarily" from
GATT requirements).
138. See generally TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 10, at 301-30.
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relationships, like the British Commonwealth countries, the European
Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the
Mercosur, and the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement are permissible
exceptions to the norm.3 9 Nevertheless, there is a generalized expecta-
tion that all members of the W.T.O. are moving toward an ideal of
nondiscriminatory open trade in goods and services. Although there
may not yet be a legally binding prohibition on national barriers to all
cultural services, the implicit understanding of member states is that
they should reduce or eliminate such barriers over time. 40 Cultural
goods are subject to GATT, and to a limited extent, some restrictions on
cultural services already have been subjected to nondiscriminatory open
trade rules under GATS. a'
Neither the text of GATT nor GATS explicitly provided for any
cultural exception to the norm of nondiscriminatory open trade. How-
ever, one could argue that GATT Article XX contained an implied
cultural exception to GATT free trade requirements. 42 GATT Article
XX provided general exceptions from the nondiscriminatory open trade
rules. Article XX (a) allowed contracting parties to adopt measures inter
alia to protect "public morals.' 4'  This exception did not explicitly
authorize states to impose trade restrictions to protect culture. Arguably,
139. See, GAT', supra note 123, at art. XXIV.
140. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 10, at 225-36.
141. With the marriage of telecommunications services and other audiovisual services,
it is arguable that some audiovisual services may already be subject to the national treatment
provisions of GATS as telecommunications. For example, on-line and cable services may be
characterized as telecommunications, rather than traditional audiovisual services.
142. In addition to GATT Article XX, there are two other exceptions to the nondis-
crimination norm that arguably recognized a cultural exception. GATI Article IV contained
the only explicit cultural exception for cinematograph films. See GATT, supra note 123, at
art. IV. Article IV permitted GATT parties to require that cinemas devote a minimum pro-
portion of the total screen time utilized to domestically produced films. Id. at art. IV(a).
Article IV also provided that parties should negotiate for the liberalization of restrictions on
foreign films. Id. at art. IV(d). The British, Norwegian and Czech Governments insisted on
this provision in the 1947 GATT to protect their national film industries. Although the
GATr has never authoritatively determined that this exception did not apply to videotaped
or filmed television programs, in practice it has been read narrowly to cover only cinema-
tograph film. See Robin L. Van Harpen, Mammas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to be
Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 108,
168-170 (1995).
Article XIX, known as the "escape clause," provided that if a GATIT concession results
in an increase in imports that substantially cause serious injury or threatens a domestic pro-
ducer of a like or directly competitive product, the importing state may suspend or withdraw
the concession. See GATT, supra note 123, at art. XIX(l)(a). In principle, an increase in a
cultural import that causes serious injury to a domestic producer could justify raising a tariff
or imposing a voluntary export restraint agreement. However, such import restrictions are
only permissible under GATT temporarily to allow time for the domestic industry to adjust.
Article XIX may not be used as a permanent restriction on foreign cultural imports.
143. Id., at art. XX (a).
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it may be difficult to distinguish between a cultural exception and a
measure to protect the public morals. For example, the United States
limits the import of products produced by involuntary or indentured
child labor.' 4 You may import a hand-woven rug in the United States,
but you may not import a rug produced by an indentured child. The im-
port restriction is triggered by how the good is produced, rather than the
category of good. In defense of this import restriction, one could argue
that Article XX (a) permitted states to ban imports that offend public
sensibilities or standards of decency and morality. Surely, the public
would be offended by child labor, and the ban reinforces the moral stan-
dard against child labor. Similarly, the United States bans films and
videotapes that government censors determine are pornographic, pre-
cisely to safeguard cultural standards of decency. 45 Thus, one could
argue that the public morality exception in Article XX might be ex-
tended to protect the public from any import that threatens fundamental
cultural values.
146
Article XX (f) provided another general exception to the GATT
nondiscrimination principle for measures "imposed for the protection of
national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value."'' 47 Obvi-
ously, the intended purpose here was to protect national patrimony from
foreign art collectors. One could argue for a broad reading of Article
XX (f) that allowed states to take measures to protect the contemporary
domestic cultural industries that produce artistic treasures. Otherwise,
GATT only permitted states to impose export restrictions to prevent the
loss of artistic work produced by dead artists, not contemporary artistic
work.
Despite these arguments, most authorities agree that Article XX
must be read narrowly because terms like "public morals" and "national
144. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-61,§ 634, 111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997).
145. See 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1994). See also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
146. See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J.
OF INT'L L. 689 (1998) (analyzing the reach of the moral exception in GATT Art. XX and
concluding that both the GAI'r and the GATS should be read as permitting broad moral
exceptions to free trade; for example, the author argues that states have the right to ban the
import of goods produced by child labor.); Tina W. Chao, Comment, GATT's Cultural Ex-
emption of Audiovisual Trade: The United States May Have Lost the Battle But Not the War,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1127 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Trade without Values, 90 Nw.
U.L. REV. 658 (1996); Anthony de Fazekas, Free Trade and Culture: An Alternative Ap-
proach, 2 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 154-55 (1993); Van Harpen, supra note 142;
Michael Braun & Leigh Parker, Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or Cherished Ar-
ticulation of a Nation's Soul?, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155 (1993).
147. GATT, supra note 123, at art. 20(f).
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treasures" escape easy definition.' 8 An expansive reading of Article XX
would allow the exceptions to swallow the rule of nondiscrimination.
For just that reason, the general exceptions contained in Article XX
were limited by a prohibition against "arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination."'49 Whether measures designed to safeguard public morals
or cultural industries are justifiable might depend upon two factors.
First, the importing country must prove the extent to'which an actual
direct threat existed to the public morals or to national artistic treasures.
Second, the importing country must show the degree to which the
measure undertaken related directly and proportionately to the perceived
threat. In other words, to use Article XX, a member state would have to
argue that imports were a proximate cause of injury or the threat of in-
jury to the public morals or to a competing cultural industry.1
50
As a practical matter, most cultural trade consists of the licensing of
copyrights and constitutes a "service," which is generally covered by
the GATS, subject to the schedule of commitments to liberalize. As dis-
cussed above, presently broadcasting and audiovisual services are not
included in the schedule of commitments to liberalize.'5 ' The United
States successfully opposed the E.U. proposal for an explicit cultural
exception clause in GATS. To the extent that broadcasting, audiovisual
services, and publishing, now or in the future, may be covered by
GATS, the Europeans and the United States continue to disagree
whether GATS implies, or should contain, a cultural exception. 2 Like
GATT, GATS contained a general exception for measures "necessary to
protect public morals."' 53 Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round,
the European Union has maintained its 1989 Directive on Television
Without Frontiers, 4 which provided that at least fifty percent of
148. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 206-207. Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 146.
149. GATT, supra note 123, at art. XX.
150. Interestingly, leading treatises on the law of GATT hardly mention the general ex-
ceptions in Article XX for national treasures and public morals. Apparently, these authorities
all read these exceptions narrowly. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); HUDEC, supra note 10; JACKSON, supra
note 10; EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 400, 420 (1986); TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra
note 10.
151. See GATS, supra note 132, at art. XIX.
152. See CAHN & SCHIMMEL, supra note 136, at 293-301.
153. GATS, supra note 132, at art. XIV (a): A note attached to Art. XIV states that
"[t]he public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious
threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society." One might argue then that the
same limiting principle should apply to the interpretation of "public morals."
154. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain
Provisions Laid Down By Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Con-
cerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23.
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television programming broadcast by any European network must
be produced in Europe. In effect, cultural services have neither been
expressly excluded nor included under the national treatment provi-
sions of GATS.
In addition to GATT and GATS, a state may be able to assert a cul-
tural exception to the norm of nondiscriminatory open trade under other
multilateral and regional trade agreements. Two prominent examples of
a cultural exception clause were contained in the Canadian Free Trade
Agreement ("C.F.T.A.") and the N.A.F.T.A.' 5 Article 2005 of the
C.F.T.A. excluded from the requirements of the C.F.T.A. all cultural
industries subject to certain limitations.5 6 The language of the C.F.T.A.
defined cultural industries to include the production and distribution of
books, periodicals, film, video and audio recordings, radio, television,and cble • 157
and cable broadcasting. Essentially, the C.F.T.A. included all copy-
righted industries that already enjoy some protection from infringing
imports under the copyright laws. In principle, the C.F.T.A. and
NAFTA both permitted some restrictions on cultural imports. To the
extent cultural-import restrictions conflict with the GATT or GATS, it
is unclear whether the C.F.T.A. cultural exception trumps the GATT
requirements. For example, the C.F.T.A. arguably would permit Canada
to deny national treatment to a foreign copyright holder contrary to the
national treatment provisions under the W.T.O. Trade Related Intellec-
155. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, art. 2005(1), 27 I.L.M.
281 (1988) [hereinafter C.F.T.A.]; Annex 2106 of NAFTA incorporates by reference Art.
2005 and applies it to relations between Mexico and Canada as well. See North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). The issue has
arisen in connection with Mexico because Mexico has no cultural barriers against the U.S.
cultural exports. Language creates its own cultural barrier. Mexico, instead, seeks access to
the growing U.S. Latino population.
Similar to the NAFTA, Article 128 of the European Community Treaty requires that the
European Community must "take cultural aspects into account in its action under other pro-
visions of the Treaty."
156. Although cultural industries were generally excluded from the C.F.T.A., Art.
2005-07 eliminated certain restrictions on cultural imports. C.F.T.A., supra note 155, at arts.
2005-07. First, it eliminated tariffs on cultural imports. Id. Second, it required that fair
compensation should be paid for any foreign investment in a cultural industry that was ex-
propriated. Id. Third, it terminated a provision of the Canadian Income Tax Act that required
that publications must be printed in Canada in order for advertisers to be permitted to deduct
advertising expenses from their Canadian income. Id. at art. 2008. Finally, it ensured that
U.S. copyrights would be respected when U.S. television programs were received by Cana-
dians and rebroadcast. Id. at art. 2006. The United States could retaliate by seeking relief
from unfair trade practices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2411 et
seq. In addition, Article 2005(2) would permit the United States to retaliate against any Ca-
nadian cultural exception by taking measures against Canadian products of equivalent value.
Id. at art 2005(2).
157. C.F.T.A., supra note 155, at art. 2012.
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tual Property Rights ("TRIPS") Agreement. 58 The United States has
taken the position that under NAFTA the United States would be per-
mitted to retaliate against Canada if it denied national treatment to a
U.S. copyright holder, while Canada has taken the opposite view. 59
When Canada undertook cultural measures to limit the distribution of
U.S. split-edition periodicals in Canada, the United States found a way
around the cultural exception to NAFTA by challenging the Canadian
law directly under the GATT national treatment provisions. The deci-
sion of the W.T.O. regarding Canadian cultural measures is discussed
below in section C.
In sum, we have seen that GATT and GATS together have created a
strong norm of nondiscriminatory open trade. Moreover, there is no
specific exception in either the GATT or GATS for culture. Neverthe-
less, as we will see below, state actors often raise the possibility of a
cultural exception to the nondiscriminatory open trade norm as a justifi-
cation for import barriers.
B. Inter-state Conflicts over Cultural Exceptions to Trade
In March 1998, the United Nations sponsored a conference in
Stockholm to discuss the threat posed by globalization to national cul-
ture. Delegates agreed to the need for a cultural exception to permit
restrictions on foreign investment in cultural industries. In June 1998,
Canada invited representatives from 19 countries, including the United
Kingdom, Brazil and Mexico, to the first meeting of the International
Network on Cultural Policies. The meeting discussed strategies for
claiming cultural exceptions from the international norm of open trade.
Canadian Culture Minister, Sheila Copps, who called the meeting,
warned, "[w]e can't treat culture like any other commodity in the
world," and insisted that cultural diversity "is at the very heart of our
national identity." '6° The Network re-convened in Mexico in September
1999. Cultural ministers from 17 countries agreed "cultural goods and
services, including audiovisual means, deserve special treatment, since
they reflect national and regional cultural identities."'
' 6
158. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
159. For an analysis of this question, see Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 136, at 304-10.
Article 2005(2) of the C.F.T.A. authorized either party to retaliate against any measure
authorized by the cultural exemption up to an amount equal to the amount of harm suffered.
C.F.T.A., supra note 155, at art. 2005(2).
160. Quoted in Howard Williams, Culture Ministers Agree to Maintain Lobby to Offset
Trade Negotiators, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jun. 30, 1998.
161. Second Informal Meeting of the International Network on Cultural Policies Work
Report, Sept. 20-21, 1999.
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These states share the concern that cultural imports, especially from
the United States, have two kinds of harmful effects. First, cultural im-
ports compete with domestic cultural products in the same way that
imports may threaten any other domestic producer. U.S. video imports
to France take market share away from French videos, and French video
producers earn lower profits and lose jobs. This effect by itself cannot
justify treating cultural imports differently. Import substitution threatens
domestic producers and workers whether they produce videos or tex-
tiles. If consumers prefer the price or quality of imported goods, then
domestic producers must either compete harder or suffer losses. In this
respect, we cannot distinguish cultural imports from any other imports,
and GATT does not generally permit protecting domestic industries.
Second, cultural imports displace and transform domestic culture weak-
ening the bonds that define nationhood. Cultural commodities shape the
expectations and values of citizens: music may celebrate sexuality and
rebellion; films and television may describe sexual and familial rela-
tionships in ways that may be shocking or unconventional; literature and
fine arts may challenge the existing social or political order. Thus, cul-
tural imports may be viewed as displacing domestic cultural industries
or influencing the nation's values and behavior.
Many states claim a cultural exception for certain goods or services.
The E.U. has been one of the leading opponents of U.S. cultural hegem-
ony. In particular, France has claimed a cultural exception to restrict the
import of U.S. television programs, videos, sound recordings, and film,
and France has long maintained quotas limiting foreign film, television,
and music.62 French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin recently assured the
French Parliament that "[w]e want to make our European partners share
the simple and fundamental idea that culture cannot be treated like
goods."'63 France seeks to preserve its cultural institutions connected
with written and spoken expression partly to safeguard the French lan-
guage from the spread of English.' 64 France has insisted that cultural
162. France, for example, has required that movie theaters must show French films at
least 20 weeks out of the year. See Anthony DePalma, Isn't So Simple To Be Canadian, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1999, at El.
163. Neil Buckley, Brussels Fails to Find a Common Line, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct.
14, 1999, at 15.
164. French "Intellectuals fear that the French Language, long under siege by English
needs defending." John Rockwell, The Talk of Paris; French Strike a Linguistic Blow in
Their Film Industry's Oscars, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1993, at C 11. Other critics suggest that
France's true motive is protectionist. The cultural exception "is the ruse by which Paris justi-
fies the very un-free-market subsidies it pays its domestic film and entertainment
industries-which it says would otherwise be swamped by U.S. imports." Kevin Sullivan,
When France, US Agree-for Different Reasons, BUSINEss TIMES (SINGAPORE), Feb. 20,
1998, at 1t.
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exception clauses be added to a range of multilateral instruments for
trade liberalization.' 65 For example, France blocked agreement in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on a
Multilateral Investment Treaty (MAI), which would have affected $500
billion in investments annually, because the United States refused to
agree to a cultural exception within the treaty. 166 Moreover, France has
aligned itself with other E.U. member states, francophone countries, and
Canada in demanding the creation of a cultural exception to the GATT,
GATS, and other liberalization agreements.
167
The French objections to free trade in cultural goods and services
are shared by numerous other trading partners in different contexts. The
largest U.S. trading partners, Canada and Mexico, have discussed the
need for imposing limits on cultural imports. 168 South Korea has main-
tained strict controls on the import of foreign films, particularly
Japanese films. Only recently, Korea has pledged to begin gradual liber-
alization of its cultural controls, while still maintaining its right to a
cultural exception.'69 Malaysia and Singapore have resisted the inflow of
foreign television and films, maintaining strict censorship in the name
of defending national values. The Malaysian Prime Minister has warned
against foreign television, "[t]oday they broadcast slanted news, tomor-
row they will broadcast raw pornography to corrupt our children and
destroy our culture."'7 Similarly, the Governments of India and Egypt,
the world's largest film producing countries, as well as Australia have
165. See French Film Industry Leaders Urge Renewed Battle on Cultural Exception, 15
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1830 (Nov. 4, 1998); France will be 'Inflexible,' in Defending
Culture at W.T.O.: Jospin, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 12, 1999.
166. See Lawrence J. Speer & Gary G. Yerkey, France Pulls Out of OECD Talks on
Multilateral Investment Treaty, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1750 (Oct. 21, 1998); Sullivan,
supra note 164, at 11.
167. See, e.g., Erwan Jourand, Francophone Leaders Urge Greater Focus on Human
Rights, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sep. 5, 1999; Lawrence J. Speer, Investment Pact in Jeop-
ardy in OECD as Members Agree to Six-Month Pause, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 723
(Apr. 29, 1998).
168. In 1999, Canadian and Mexican officials issued a joint communiqu6 calling for
protection for cultural diversity. See Americas/NAFTA: In Brief, 16 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 338 (Feb. 24, 1999).
169. See Korean Filmmakers Desperate to Defend Screen Quota, KOREA TIMES, Jun.
15, 1999; Controversy Arises Over Import of Japanese Culture, ASIAN EcON. NEWS KYODO
NEWS INT'L , Feb. 7, 1994; Michael Newman, Building Bridges: South Korea Slowly Re-
treats from Ban on Japanese Culture, FAR E. EcON. REV., Nov. 24, 1994, at 114.
170. Jonathan Karp, Cast of Thousands, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 27, 1994, at 46; ER-
HARD U. HEIDT, MASS MEDIA, CULTURAL TRADITION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE CASE
OF SINGAPORE AND ITS TELEVISION PROGRAMMES 162 (1987).
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joined the Europeans in defending the need for some "cultural protec-
tion" to maintain their indigenous film industries.''
Some countries have sought to extend the cultural exception to in-
clude even agriculture and other consumer products not ordinarily
regarded as cultural goods. Korea and Japan have defended protectionist
measures against rice imports on the ground that rice farming is an an-
cient tradition central to their culture threatened by rice imports.'72
Similarly, U.S. politicians defend agricultural subsidies for U.S. farmers
to preserve the family farm as a pillar of American life.'73 Japan im-
posed higher domestic taxes on imported spirits like whiskey than it
imposed on certain Japanese alcoholic beverages, like shochu, to protect
beverages closely linked to traditional Japanese secular and religious
occasions.'74 To preserve its beer traditions, Germany only permitted
beer produced according to an ancient German recipe to be sold as
"bier" in Germany.' 75 Rice, liquor, and beer are only three examples of
how broadly culture may be construed.
Almost all states seek to protect some aspect of their culture from
competing imported commodities. With increasing frequency states are
challenging the international legal norm of nondiscriminatory open
trade by asserting a cultural exception. In the section that follows, we
will consider the underlying assumptions of this argument.
C. Analysis of the Cultural Exception to Free Trade
The cultural exception to free trade rests upon three premises: First,
states can distinguish cultural commodities from non-cultural com-
modities. Second, states can distinguish between foreign and domestic
culture. Third, states can, and should, protect their own national culture
against foreign influences. Each of these premises is faulty.
171. See U.S. Urges Free Worldwide Trade in Movies, Radio Programs During Uru-
guay Round Talks, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1369 (Sept. 12, 1990). See generally SEAN
MACBRIDE, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (1980).
172. See Asian Farmers Protect Against Liberalizing Rice Imports, ASIAN ECON. NEWS
KYODO NEWS INT'L, Dec. 6, 1993; South Koreans Upset by Rice Market Opening Plans,
ASIAN ECON. NEWS KYODO NEWS INT'L, Dec. 12, 1993; Thais Opt for Patience to Counter
Bias on Rice, ASIAN ECON. NEWS KYODO NEWS INT'L, Mar. 21, 1994.
173. Less than three percent of the populations of Japan and the United States are farm-
ers. In that light, the centrality of U.S. and Japanese farmers to their respective national
cultures is questionable.
174. As discussed below, a GATT panel rejected these arguments. See Report of Panel
in Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes And Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, L/6216-34S/83, 1 1.1 (adopted Nov. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Japan Alcohol Panel
Report].
175. The European Court of Justice rejected this argument as a disguised form of
quantitative restriction on imports. See Case 178/84, Commission of the European Commu-
nities v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
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First, it is doubtful one can distinguish cultural commodities from
any other goods or services. The meaning of a cultural import is itself
subject to dispute. We do not generally regard beer, liquor, whale meat,
or sports magazines as cultural goods, yet, as discussed below, states
have argued that each of these commodities was a cultural good. Motion
pictures are one of the leading commercial exports of the United States,
but some Europeans see Hollywood films as an insidious agent of cul-
tural imperialism. Many goods that we might agree are not cultural
nevertheless have cultural reverberations. Manufacturers market soft
drinks, automobiles, and jeans as expressions of individual freedom,
sexuality, and rebellion. The Calvin Klein underwear ads boldly dis-
played in major cities throughout the world surely bear a not-too-subtle
cultural message of relaxed mores, objectified male and female sexual-
ity, and non-traditional gender roles. Advertisers both popularize
cultural attitudes and lifestyles and transform them, so it is hardly sur-
prising when some foreign governments object to U.S. advertising as
overtly sexual or inappropriate. A traditional society may fear the influ-
ence of the Pepsi Generation no less than the music of Rage Against the
Machine or the films of Steven Spielberg.
All commodities shape culture. Cultural anthropologists view cul-
ture as material production. Televisions, facsimile machines, personal
computers, and cell phones have transformed our culture both because
of the information they can disseminate instantaneously and because of
the material values that they embody. A society of individuals who pur-
sue the acquisition of extravagant electronics communicates different
values from a traditional agrarian society. As western commodities like
fast foods, the internet, and Palm Pilots facilitate a more rapid pace of
living, cultural change will follow.
The second premise underlying the cultural exception to trade is
that we can distinguish foreign and domestic culture. This premise is
equally flawed. Throughout history, new cultural forms have followed
migration, trade, and investment; the process of global acculturation is
normal and vital for human society.'76 Culture is not bounded by na-
tional .territory; it is the product of sub-national and transnational
influences. Nations cross-trade culture. Among our art, literature, music,
cuisine, dress, and social attitudes, we must acknowledge that much of
what we regard as English, Japanese or American came from other
176. See SASKIA SASSEN, GUESTS AND ALIENS (1999). Sassen has shown that mass mi-
grations have occurred throughout European history according to certain predictable
patterns. This pattern has become more extreme under a regime where capital is almost com-
pletely free from government control while workers are relatively immobile. Historically,
immigrants were welcomed into new countries as providing a rich source of labor and skills.
See id. at 2-19.
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sources. William Shakespeare wrote in an amalgam of ancient lan-
guages that we call "English" plays based upon stories that originated
throughout Europe and presented in a style derived from the ancient
Greeks. The Japanese constructed their written language and art from
borrowed Chinese written characters and painting style. American cui-
sine evolved from an eclectic mix of German, Dutch, English, Spanish,
Mexican, Chinese, Italian, and indigenous tribal ingredients. The
writing of Gabriel Garcia Marquez, the painting of Hockney, the films
of Truffaut and the social theory of Foucault shaped contemporary
American art and literature. Latin American and African music continue
to shape contemporary American and European music. These cross-
cultural influences continue into the future.
The third premise of cultural exceptions to trade is that a state can
and should protect its national culture from foreign influence. Even as-
suming that a state could distinguish between cultural and non-cultural
commodities, and between foreign and domestic culture, how could a
state seal itself off from foreign cultural influences? The practical diffi-
culties of controlling the distribution of foreign films, television, music,
and literature are immensely complicated by the availability of new
technologies like DVDs, direct broadcasting, and the internet. A citizen
with access to a phone line has access to any foreign entertainment they
desire. Moreover, foreign culture influences domestic artists, writers,
and performers. Even if Europe could prevent the distribution of U.S.
films, it could not prevent the influence of U.S. film directors on its own
directors. Nor will Europe be able to control the cross-cultural influ-
ences of travel and tourism. European students visiting the United States
will return home demanding access to the same films and television that
U.S. students enjoy. Ultimately, the only way a country could effec-
tively insulate itself from foreign cultural influence would be to close its
borders to all foreign trade and tourism, deny its own citizens travel vi-
sas, and censor its own media and artists. Cultural autarchy, in other
words, is inconsistent with the condition of modem life or the principles
of democracy.
Despite these analytical difficulties, states increasingly invoke a
cultural exception to trade. Clearly, the growing volume of world trade
has heightened concerns about foreign influences. As I will develop
more fully below, what drives the urgency for import controls on cul-
tural products is a displaced fear of globalization. Canada expressed that
concern in adopting certain measures to defend its culture. The W.T.O.
rejected the cultural exception argument in a recent decision brought by
[Vol. 22:1
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the United States against Canada.' In rejecting Canada's defense to
restraints on cultural imports, the W.T.O. implied that Canada's true
motivation was economic protectionism masquerading as cultural. The
next section discussing the Canadian case illustrates the curious rela-
tionship between economic interest and cultural exceptions. As will be
shown, cultural exceptions to trade fail in part because they are tainted
by economic interest. The rules of trade function to protect the rational-
ity of the market from the irrationality of cultural preferences.
D. W. T. 0. Decision on Canadian Cultural Measures
The Canadian Government has long complained of the overwhelm-
ing cultural shadow cast by the United States on Canadian culture. 7 '
Canadians perceive that they are peculiarly vulnerable to U.S. cultural
exports because of the relative size of population, the concentration of
population close to the U.S. border, the predominance of U.S. film, tele-
vision, and music, and the absence of any language barrier.'79 Many
Canadians believe that government support for a national culture is vital
to define a sense of nationhood and pull together the disparate popula-
tion centers spread across Canada.' 80 In 1985, the Canadian Minister of
Communications Benoit Bouchard asserted that, "[w]e believe that, just
as retaining our territorial sovereignty is essential if we are to remain an
independent nation, so it is true that we must always retain our cultural
177. WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS 31/R (March 14, 1997)[hereinafter Panel Report]; WTO Appellate Body Report,
Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted June 30,
1997)[hereinafter Appellate Report].
178. See, John Herd Thompson, Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protection,
Promotion, and Popular Culture, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS? INTEGRATING
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO 269-83 (Stephen J. Randal et al. eds., 1992);
Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade, National Iden-
tity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203 (1998); J.
Michael Robinson, The Information Revolution-Culture and Sovereignty-A Canadian
Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 147 (1998); DePalma, supra note 162, at El.
179. See generally ALLAN SMITH, CANADIAN CULTURE, THE CANADIAN STATE, AND
THE NEW CONTINENTALISM (1990). U.S. cultural products represent 95% of what is shown
in Canadian cinemas, 80% of Canadian television news broadcasts, 60% of Canadian book-
shelf space and 80% of English-language magazines. See Robinson, supra note 178, at 144-
48. Of course, what constitutes a U.S. cultural product is difficult to say. For example, most
Canadians ignored the fact that until recently the Seagram Corp. of Quebec owned
MCA/Universal, which is one of the largest entertainment companies located in the United
States. Seagram purchased MCA/Universal from Matsushita of Japan in 1995. Do
MCAlUniversal films distributed in the United States represent Canadian, Japanese or U.S.
cultural values?
180. See, e.g., Id.; Thompson, supra note 178.
Fall 2000]
Michigan Journal of International Law
sovereignty-the absolute right in the eyes of the world to use all the
instruments at our disposal."' 8 '
Since the 1950's, Canada has adopted a wide range of measures
aimed at protecting Canadian culture, primarily from the predominant
culture of the United States.'82 These measures have led to a series of
trade disputes between Canada and the United States over Canadian
cultural protectionism. 3 The Canadian Government has regarded U.S.
news and popular magazines as particularly threatening to Canada's
sense of national identity' 4 and has tried to limit the influence of U.S.
publications and news media in Canada.' In particular, Canada re-
stricted the publication of "split-run magazines" marketed in Canada. A
split-run magazine has substantially the same content as a foreign publi-
cation, but contains advertisements aimed at the Canadian market. The
Canadian Government argued that larger U.S. publications like Time
181. Canadian Minister of Communications Benoit Bouchard as quoted in 1985, ac-
cording to Ivan Berniew, Cultural Sovereignty and Free Trade, in ASSESSING THE CANADA-
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 235, 241 (Murray G. Smith & Frank Stone eds., 1987).
182. See generally Goodenough, supra note 178 at 210-17. For example, Canada has
restricted foreign ownership of television and radio stations. See Canadian Broadcasting Act
of 1991, 1991 S.C. 119 (1985) (Can.). For a complete historical survey of Canadian broad-
casting policy, see RICHARD COLLINS, CULTURE, COMMUNICATION, AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY: THE CASE OF CANADIAN TELEVISION (1990). Canada also regulates foreign in-
vestment generally in cultural industries under the Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 28
(1985)(Can.), amended by ch. 65, 1988 S.C. 2094 (Can.), ch. 35, 1993 S.C. 1 (Can.) and ch.
44, 1993 S.C. 130 (Can.). Canada has extensive controls on U.S. films, music and literature.
For example, Canadian regulations require music radio stations to play at least 35%
"Canadian" music during the daytime. To determine the nationality of a piece of music
points are awarded based upon whether a Canadian was predominantly involved in the mu-
sic, performance, production and lyrics. At least two of these four categories must be
predominantly Canadian to qualify. Thus, for example, the song "My Heart Will Go On," by
the Canadian singer Celine Dion is not deemed sufficiently Canadian, but "Rhythm of My
Heart," by the U.S. singer Rod Stewart is deemed Canadian because a Canadian wrote the
music and the lyrics. Canada also requires that television stations must schedule at least 60%
Canadian programs, many of which are actually U.S. produced television programs filmed in
Canada. See DePalma, supra note 162, at 32.
183. See, e.g., Andrew M. Carlson, The Country Music Television Dispute: An Illustra-
tion of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protectionism and American Entertainment
Exports, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585 (1997). In 1997, Canada amended its copyright laws
to provide "neighboring rights" in order to create additional revenues for Canadian cultural
industries. See Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Canadian Copyright Act, 2nd Sess., 35th
Parliament (1997). Neighboring rights are derivative copyrights that benefit contributors to a
copyrighted work. Neighboring rights protect persons who would not otherwise receive a
royalty, such as musicians who perform on a recording. See generally John A. Ragosta, The
Information Revolution-Culture and Sovereignty-A U.S. Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155
(1998).
184. See Panel Report, supra note 177, 3.29. According to the Canadian Government,
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Magazine, Sports Illustrated and Premiere Magazine, which ran split-
run Canadian editions, threatened to supplant Canadian popular culture,
unless Canada adopted these import restrictions.'
8 6
In 1965 Canada enacted Tariff Code 9958 to prohibit the import of
split-run or special edition periodicals that contained any advertisement
directed to the Canadian market that did not appear in the home country
edition of that periodical.' 7 In 1993 the Time Warner Corporation found
a way around the import barrier on split-run editions. Time began pub-
lishing a Canadian edition of Sports Illustrated by transmitting
electronically the editorial content from its U.S. edition to a press in
Canada. 8' Canadian politicians complained that Sports Illustrated Can-
ada threatened to obscure Canadian sports culture and that other U.S.
periodicals would soon flood the Canadian market with split-run edi-
tions.8 9 In response, the parliament in 1995 amended the Excise Tax Act
by imposing a tax on split-run editions equal to 80% of the value of all
the advertising revenue earned by the edition.' 9 In effect, the Excise Tax
Act made it unprofitable to publish a split-run edition in Canada.
In May 1996, the United States challenged the Canadian restrictions
on split-runs before a panel of the W.T.O. Dispute Settlement Body.''
The United States argued that these measures violated several GATT
186. See Aarow Scow, The Sports Illustrated Canada Controversy: Canada "Strikes
Out" in its Bid to Protect its Periodical Industry from U.S. Split-Run Periodicals, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 245 (1998).
187. R.S.C. 1985, c. 41 (3rd Suppl.) as amended to 30 April 1996, s. 114, Sch. VII,
Item 9958, (1996 Customs Tariff: Departmental Consolidation) Ottawa: Minister of Supply
& Services Canada, 1996. Note that in 1988 Canada amended Tariff Code 9958 to allow
Canadian publishers to print all or part of their Canadian issues in the United States. See
Panel Report, supra note 177, T 2.5.
188. See Panel Report, supra note 177, T 3.25.
189. See Panel Report, supra note 177, TT 3.26-.27.
190. See Bill C-103, An Act to amend the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act, S.C.
1995, c. 46. This provision tightened the definition of a split-run edition to include any peri-
odical distributed in Canada in which more than 20 % of the editorial content is substantially
the same as foreign editions and contains at least one advertisement that does not appear identi-
cally in foreign editions. See Panel Report, supra note 177, T 2.6-2.7. Canada "grandfathered"
certain split-run magazines that were produced in Canada prior to Sports Illustrated Canada,
notably including Time Canada and Reader's Digest. See id. 2.8.
The Government also authorized Canada Post to charge preferential rates for commer-
cial Canadian publications, and the Government funded Canada Post to grant special rates to
certain domestic publications designated by the Department of Canadian Heritage for the
purposes of promoting Canadian culture. See id. I 2.10-.l 1.
191. The United States brought its complaint to the W.T.O., rather than to the NAFTA,
to escape the cultural exceptions provision contained in the C.F.T.A. Art. 2005(1) and incor-
porated by reference into Annex 2106 of NAFTA. See supra note 155. C.F.T.A. Art. 2005(1)
excludes cultural industries from the national treatment requirement of the C.F.T.A. See id.
at 2005(1). Under the C.F.T.A. the United States probably would not have been able to
make a claim against Canada for protecting its periodical industry.
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provisions.' The United States principally argued that the Excise Tax
Act violated GATT Article III national treatment by imposing a dis-
criminatory tax on U.S. split-run edition advertising revenue.'93 The first
sentence of Article III (2) provided that contracting parties should not
subject the imported products of another contracting party to "internal
taxes ... in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like do-
mestic products.' '94 The United States claimed that imported split-run
192. In addition to the principal U.S. claim discussed in the text, the United States
charged that the ban on imported periodicals in section 9958 of the Tariff Code violated the
prohibition on import bans contained in GATT Article Xl. See Panel Report, supra note 177,
TI 3.1. See also GATT, supra note 123, at art. XI. Canada argued that GATT Article XX(d)
permitted Tariff Code 9958 as a measure "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations" not inconsistent with the GATr. See Panel Report, supra note 177, T 3.2 and
T 3.5. Canada denied that these measures had a protectionist purpose Canada asserted that
one purpose of the import ban was to secure compliance with Section 19 of the Income Tax
Act, which allowed advertisers to deduct the expense of advertising directed to the Canadian
market only on condition that the ads were placed in Canadian periodicals. Canada asserted
that the Excise Tax merely protected a national vehicle for the expression of Canadian values
and ideas. Canada pointed out that the prohibition on imports did not prevent U.S. publica-
tions from distributing their U.S. editions in Canada. The Panel, however, rejected the
argument that Tariff Code 9958 secured compliance with the advertising deduction in Sec-
tion 19. The Panel found that the import ban on split-run magazines was inconsistent with
the literal terms of Art. XI and that it was not justifiable under Art. XX(d). Id., 5.5-.11.
The United States also argued that the postal subsidies provided by Canada Post violated
GATT Article Ill national treatment because it treated U.S. magazines differently from Ca-
nadian magazines. See id. $ 5.2. Canada denied that the postal subsidies discriminated
against foreign publications in violation of Article III national treatments. See id. 5.2. Can-
ada argued that the postal subsidies were available only to some domestic publishers that
satisfied the qualifications set out by the Department of Canadian Heritage, and all other
domestic and foreign publishers were subject to the same commercial rates. GATT Article
II (8) specifically permitted subsidies to assist domestic industries. See id. [ 3.150. The
United States argued that subsidies were only permissible if paid directly to the domestic
producer. Here, the subsidies were paid to Canada Post for the purposes of offering qualified
industries lower postal rates. See id. [ 3.146. Canada also argued that Canada Post had a
separate legal personality from the Government and therefore, its actions were not
"regulations" attributable to the Government for the purposes of Article III national treat-
ment. See id. IT 3.151-.152. The United States disputed the idea that a contracting party
could have created a separate corporate entity with authority to take actions in violation of
the GATT without the contracting party being responsible for the corporation's acts. See id.
fl 3.157-158. The U.S. position was internally inconsistent with regard to the postal subsi-
dies. On the one hand, the United States argued that the Government and Canada Post were
the same entity. On the other hand, the United States argued that a transfer of funds to Can-
ada Post, rather than to Canadian publishers directly, was not a permissible domestic subsidy
under GATT, because Canada Post was the direct beneficiary of the subsidy. See id. 3.198.
The Panel concluded that the differential postal rates for domestic and foreign magazines
were inconsistent with Art. 111(4), but that the funded rates paid to Canada Post were permis-
sible domestic subsidies under Art. 111(8). Id. 5.38-44. On appeal, the Appellate Body
reversed the Panel's finding and determined that the funded postal rates were not justified
under Art. 111(8). Appellate Report, supra note 177, at 35-38.
193. See Panel Report, supra note 177, $ 3.1.
194. GATT, supra note 123, at art. III.
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magazines were "like domestic" Canadian magazines, and therefore,
imported split-runs could not be subject to discriminatory excise
taxes.' 95 In the event that the Panel did not find that imported split-run
magazines were like domestic Canadian magazines, the United States
argued that imported split-run magazines were at least "directly com-
petitive or substitutable" goods.'96 The United States pointed to the
second sentence of Article III (2), which provided that "no contacting
party shall otherwise apply internal taxes ... to imported.., products in
a manner [so as to afford protection to domestic production]." Accord-
ing to the interpretative notes attached to the 1994 GATT, this second
sentence applied where the taxed import and the untaxed domestic
product were "directly competitive or substitutable," even if they were
not necessarily "like" products.' 97
Canada responded first that the excise tax applied to advertising
revenues and not to the magazine itself.'98 Thus, in Canada's view the
dispute concerned access to advertising services and should be subject
to the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS], rather than to
GATT, which applied only to tangible goods. Under GATS Canada did
not make any commitment to grant national treatment to advertising
services provided by other contracting parties. 99 The Panel, however,
found that both GATT and GATS applied in this circumstance.2°°
Second, Canada asserted that even if the GATT did apply, a split-
run edition was not a "like product" for purposes of Article III national
treatment.20' Canada argued that magazines, unlike other commodities,
were intended for intellectual consumption, and as such, the intellectual
content of the magazine was the most important characteristic for pur-
poses of determining "like products. 2 °2
To a large extent the arguments presented to the Panel turned on this
question whether a foreign split-run periodical is a "like" or "directly
195. See Panel Report, supra note 177, 3.32. The United States also argued that in the
event the Panel decided that the excise tax was not subject to Art. 111(2), it should apply Art.
111(4). The United States asserted that the Excise Tax Act violated Art. 111(4) which provided
that imports of a contracting party "shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting their internal sale ..... Id. $ 3.144-. 145.
196. Id. 3.111.
197. "A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence [of Art. 111(2)] would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence.. where.. .a
directly competitive or substitutable product ... was not similarly taxed." GATT, supra note
123, at annex I, and art. 111(2).
198. See Panel Report, supra note 177, 3.33.
199. Id. IT 3.33-34.
200. Id. H 5.18-.19.
201. See id. $ 3.61.
202. See id. [13.61-.63.
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competitive" product. Canada focused on editorial content alone to the
exclusion of other criteria because content was the only distinguishing
characteristic between foreign and domestic magazines. The United
States pointed to W.T.O. precedents in support of the proposition that a
like product's characteristics must be determined with reference to its
end use, consumer tastes, substitutability and its physical properties. °3
According to the United States the end use of a magazine was its market
appeal. A publication's style, frequency, appearance, paper, size, type,
texture, thickness, and even scent determined market appeal no less than
its editorial content.' ° At its heart, this disagreement mirrored an un-
derlying value difference between the United States and Canada; in the
view of the United States, there was no essential difference between
cultural commodities like magazines or books and other commodities
like automotive parts. °5 Canada argued for special treatment for cultural
goods, but the United States responded that GATT only provided a spe-
cial exception for films.0 6 For Canada, the end-use of a magazine was
not marketability, but the transmission of ideas and culture. °7 By in-
sisting that cultural goods have no equivalent import, Canada denied
that culture could be commodified. The skeptical U.S. response re-
flected the view that culture was already in fact a commodity, and
therefore, the United States regarded the Canadian motive as indistin-
guishable from protecting any other domestic industry threatened by
imports. °8
If the Panel determined a product's character by reference to its
cultural content, then no two cultural goods could ever be truly "like
products," and correspondingly, GATT Article III national treatment
would never apply to cultural goods. Canada's argument in principle
would exempt all cultural imports from the GATT. If the Panel had ac-
cepted the Canadian position, it would have established by implication a
203. See id. 1 3.64-.70, 3.78.
204. See id. The United States rejected Canada's argument that the distinguishing char-
acteristic was the difference between original and non-original content. The consumer
demand would not be determined by the originality of the content; nor could a consumer
know whether the content was original or duplicated from a U.S. edition. In fact, the excise
tax did not distinguish between original and non-original content. A magazine that had no
original Canadian content was not subject to the tax if it were not sold outside Canada. The
same publication would be subject to tax if it were sold outside Canada and contained at
least one advertisement that was not identical to advertisements that appeared abroad. See id.
3.72.
205. See Panel Report, supra note 177, 3.66-3.85.
206. See GATT, supra note 123, at art. IV (providing that contracting parties could im-
pose certain quantitative regulations on foreign films).
207. See Panel Report, supra note 177, [ 3.61, 3.68.
208. The United States' view of restrictions on the movement of magazines also re-
flects the view that limits on the free flow of information threatens individual speech rights.
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cultural exception to GATT's nondiscriminatory trade norms. From the
Canadian perspective, the United States was insensitive at best, and dis-
honest at worst, in denying the impact of its own cultural hegemony.
The Canadians characterized the U.S. argument as "a blanket denial that
cultural products have any specificity that distinguishes them from ordi-
nary items of trade. ' '209 Canada pitted itself against the American
cultural Goliath in defense of Canadian culture.
From the U.S. perspective, the Canadians were protecting an indus-
try that happened to be engaged in popular culture; the cultural
exception merely masked the true economic motive for the Canadian
intervention in the market. The Canadians were trying to eliminate
competition from their market.1 ° Ironically, the Canadian excise tax had
the opposite effect of protectionist legislation. Rather than keeping im-
ports out and favoring domestic production, the Canadian excise tax
punished Sports Illustrated for moving its production to Canada. 21' The
Canadians pointed out that they were not protecting Canadian publish-
ing jobs. The excise tax did not depend upon whether Canadians wrote
or produced the magazine. Sports Illustrated could still sell the U.S.
edition directly to Canadians without having to pay the excise tax.2'2 The
Canadians argued that the excise tax rewarded publications for using
local editorial content, which better reflected the nation's interests and
values.2"3
The Panel agreed with the United States that the excise tax and the
prohibition on imported split-run periodicals were GATT illegal.2" It
accepted the U.S. view that U.S. split-run periodicals were "like" Cana-
dian magazines. 215 The Panel rejected Canada's theory that cultural
imports were defined by their content rather than by their marketabil-
ity21 6 and implicitly suggested that Canada's true motive was economic,
not cultural:
Despite the Canadian claim that the purpose of the legislation is
to promote publications of original Canadian content, this defini-
tion essentially relies on factors external to the Canadian
market-whether the same editorial content is included in a
209. Panel Report, supra note 177, 3.143.
210. See id. [3.120.
211. Arguably, since the magazine was published in Canada, Art. HI was not applica-
ble. Art. 111(2) of GATT only applies to products "imported into the territory" of another
party. See GATT, supra note 123, at art. 111(2).
212. See Panel Report, supra note 177,1 3.129.
213. See id. [3.5.
214. See id. 115.13-.30.
215. See id. 5.25.
216. See id. V 5.23-.26.
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foreign edition and whether the periodical carries different ad-
vertisements in foreign editions." 7
The Panel reasoned that if a Canadian-owned magazine produced a
Canadian edition and a U.S. edition with some different advertisements
and editorial content, the Canadian edition would be subject to the ex-
cise tax.28 In this hypothetical it would not matter that both editions
were otherwise designed for the same readership. No matter how "like"
these editions were, one would be subject to the excise tax in derogation
of the GATT Article 111.219 Ignoring the circularity of its own analysis,
the Panel concluded that since the imaginary Canadian and U.S. editions
could be "like products," all split-run publications and domestic non-
split-run publications were like products.2 In effect, the Panel endorsed
the U.S. view that two cultural products with the same end-use are like
products, which excluded the possibility of a cultural exception to
GATT article III national treatment."' The Panel, however, avoided
reaching this conclusion explicitly. Instead, the Panel added somewhat
cryptically that "[t]he ability of any Member to take measures to protect
its cultural identity was not at issue in the present case. 222
Canada appealed to the W.T.O. Appellate Body inter alia on the is-
sue whether the split-run periodicals and Canadian non-split-run
periodicals were like products. Canada claimed that the Panel had
avoided deciding this central issue. The Appellate Body concurred with
the Panel that the relevant criteria for determining like products in-
cluded the product's end-use, consumer preferences and the product's
properties, nature, and quality.22' However, the Appellate Body rejected
the Panel's analysis, which was based on a comparison of a hypothetical
split-run magazine with a domestic Canadian magazine .224 The Appel-
late Body pointed out that the Panel assumed what it was asked to
determine, namely, whether the magazine was sufficiently similar to
deem the domestic and split-run editions like products.2 5 Therefore, the
Appellate Body voided the Panel's findings that split-run and domestic
217. See id. 91 5.24.
218. See id. 5.25.
219. See id.
220. See id. 5.26
221. Of course, there is no formal rule of stare decisis in the GATT. Therefore, it is
conceivable that a subsequent panel decision could reverse these findings. However, as a
practical matter, it is rare that a panel has approached a decision without reasoning from
precedents. See, Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999).
222. Panel Report, supra note 177, 15.45.
223. See Appellate Report, supra note 177, at 22-23.
224. See id. at 22-23.
225. See id.
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periodicals were like products, but the Appellate Body still upheld the
U.S. complaint.2 6 The Appellate Body found that even if they were not
like products, split-run and domestic periodicals were directly competi-
tive or substitutable products for purposes of the second sentence of
GATT Article III (2).227 The Appellate Body found that Time, Time
Canada and MacLean's, for example were competitive or substitutable,
even though MacLean's featured more Canadian editorial content.228
Since the excise tax was applied to split-run editions that were directly
competitive or substitutable, the tax "afforded protection to domestic
production," in violation of GATT Article III (2) .9 The Appellate Body
opined that even if cultural imports differed from domestic products, so
long as the cultural import competed with the domestic product for the
same end use, Article III prohibited an internal tax used to protect the
domestic industry. 20 Thus, the Appellate Body concluded that Canada
should eliminate the excise tax on split-run periodicals.'
In the end, both the Panel and the Appellate Body implicitly re-
jected Canada's claim that cultural goods cannot be subject to GATT
national treatment requirements. The rhetorical structure of these opin-
ions obscured two significant aspects of the relationship between
cultural claims and the norm of free trade. First, the cultural claim was
not explicitly discussed in either opinion, because the cultural exception
was encoded in the determination of what is a like, directly competitive or
substitutable product. The legal argument translated a claim about cultural
sovereignty into a more technocratic argument about the common char-
acteristics of different products. Both the Appellate Body and the Panel
ultimately concluded that a cultural import could have enough in com-
mon with a domestic cultural good to apply the national treatment
226. See id. at 22-24.
227. See id. at 31.
228. See id. at 30-31.
229. See id. at 34.
230. See id. at 37-38. In addition to these findings, the Appellate Body reversed the
Panel's finding that the funded postal rates were justified under Article III (8). See id. at 37.
231. Since the Appellate Body's report, the United States and Canada negotiated a set-
tlement allowing U.S. split-run editions to include up to 18% Canadian advertising phased in
gradually over three years. See Canada Enacts Magazine Law Restricting Foreign Split-Run
Advertising, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 25, at 1054 (June 23, 1999). Canadian pub-
lishers opposed the compromise as a threat to Canadian identity. Within Canada the dispute
over cultural protectionism continued. One Member of Parliament opposing an earlier draft
of Bill C-55 said that his constituents had argued, "[pilease do not let this crazy effort by the
minister of heritage destroy our jobs and impair our industry by provoking the Americans
into a bilateral trade war." Reform Party MP Jason Kenney as quoted in Canadian Govern-
ment Uses Limit on Debate to Push Forward Magazines Legislation, 16 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), No. 10, at 411 (Mar. 10, 1999). Another member defended Bill C-55, as respecting
Canada's culture: "Canada will defend its rights as a sovereign country to develop measures
designed to support our domestic cultural expression." Id.
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standard. In so doing, they implicitly denied Canada's assertion that no
two cultural goods are comparable. Thus, Canada failed to persuade the
W.T.O. that there is an implied exception to national treatment for cul-
tural goods. Second, the United States argued that Canada's cultural
claim was thinly disguised economic protectionism. In the U.S. view,
the Canadians were only interested in protecting the source of advertis-
ing revenues for Canadian publications. If Canada only wanted to
advance an economic interest, then its intervention into the market was
prohibited by international open trade norms. The United States cast
doubt on Canada's motive by characterizing that motive as economic. In
other words, economic motives were disfavored by the free trade norm.
The significance of this observation is discussed in the concluding sec-
tion below.
As a result of the W.T.O. decision, Canada agreed to allow U.S.
split-run periodicals into their market.232 In so doing, Canada conceded
the cultural exception claim to the international norm of free trade.
E. Other Cultural Exceptions to GA7T
The Canadian periodicals case was not an isolated example of
GATT hostility toward claims of cultural exceptions. GATT panel re-
ports have consistently refused to recognize such an exception. For
example, in 1984, a GATT panel rejected a cultural exception argument
offered by the Government of Japan in defense of certain quotas on
leather imports.2 133 The Government of Japan had established an import
licensing scheme dating back to 1949 to limit the import of certain
leather goods in order to protect the cultural minority community known
as the "Dowa." The Dowa were regarded as the lowest social class in
Japanese society since the early seventeenth century. For centuries,
Japanese discriminated against the Dowa minority in all aspects of so-
cial life. The Dowa were restricted to certain occupations, which were
regarded as beneath other Japanese. One of the primary occupations
open to the Dowa was leather production. The Dowa tended to work in
small leather businesses that were not economically viable, and they
lived in extreme poverty. Japan contended that without import quotas,
the Dowa leather industry would collapse causing severe social and
economic dislocation to this oppressed minority community and de-
stroying traditional Dowa culture.3
232. See James Mcllroy, The International Implications of the Canada-U.S. Magazine
Dispute, 2 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 1031, 1040-47 (1999).
233. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather,
L5623-315/94, 44 (May 15, 1984)[hereinafter Japan Leather Panel Report].
234. See id. 21-22.
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The United States objected inter alia that the Japanese import li-
censing constituted an import quota in violation of GATT Article XI
and that Japan had nullified and impaired benefits accruing to the
United States under GATT in violation of Article XXIII.235 Australia, the
European Communities, India, New Zealand and Pakistan all joined the
U.S. complaint against Japan as exporters of leather to Japan.
236
The Panel acknowledged that Japan's defense of its leather import
restrictions rested almost entirely on the cultural policy of protecting the
Dowa, but the Panel concluded that
[T]he special historical, cultural and socio-economic circum-
stances referred to by Japan could not be taken into account by
[the Panel] in this context since [the Panel's] terms of reference
were to examine the matter "in the light of the relevant GATT
provisions" and these provisions did not provide such a justifi-
2311
cation for import restrictions.
Thus, the Panel recommended that Japan end its import quotas. 38
A similar dispute involving Japanese cultural defenses arose in con-
nection with the labeling and taxing of imported wines and spirits.239
Distilled liquors were classified as shochu, whiskey (including brandy),
or spirits (including vodka, gin and rum).2 ° For each class, different ex-
cise tax rates applied.2 4  The European Communities claimed that the
differential tax system discriminated against imported liquor in viola-
tion of the national treatment requirement of GATT Article 111.242 In
essence, the excise tax categories were designed to impose lower taxes
on traditional Japanese drinks like sake, mirin, and shochu, despite their
similarity in content and production to European spirits. 24 Japan con-
tended that these traditional Japanese alcoholic beverages were not
"like" or "directly competitive" with European distilled spirits.24 In de-
termining whether a product is "like" or "directly competitive," Japan
argued that the Panel must consider qualities including the image, con-
sumption, end-use, and price, as well as physical properties, such as
235. See id. 15.
236. See id. 138.
237. Id. [44.
238. See id. [59.
239. See Japan Alcohol Panel Report, supra note 174, 1.1.
240. See id. [2.3.
241. See id.
242. See id. $ 3.1. The European Communities also complained that the wines and al-
coholic beverages imported from Europe to Japan were not adequately protected by Japan
against infringement of trade names. See id.
243. See id. [3.2.
244. See id. 3.10.
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alcoholic content.24' The Panel acknowledged the significance of differ-
ent patterns of consumption in judging the likeness of two products.4 6
However, the Panel rejected the argument that a traditional domestic
product like shochu can be differentiated from an imported product like
vodka:
Since consumer habits are variable in time and space and the
aim of Article III: 2 of ensuring neutrality of internal taxation as
regards competition between imported and domestic like prod-
ucts could not be achieved if differential taxes could be used to
crystallize consumer preferences for traditional domestic prod-
ucts, the Panel found that the traditional Japanese consumer
habits with regard to shochu provided no reason for not consid-
ering vodka to be a "like" product.4 7
In the Panel's view "'like' products do not become 'unlike' merely
because of differences in local consumer traditions within a country
.. ,,248 The Panel rejected the cultural claim of Japan and recommended
that the tax differentials be eliminated.
These three panel decisions, Canadian periodicals, Japanese leather
goods, and Japanese alcoholic beverages, collectively demonstrate the
international community's deep skepticism toward claims of cultural
exception with regard to the norm of open trade. What apparently un-
derlies each of these cases is an implicit judgment that the "true" intent
or motive of the importing state is to protect their economic, as opposed
to cultural interests. Moreover, the panels uniformly have rejected the
argument that a cultural or traditional component may distinguish oth-
erwise like or directly competitive goods.
F. Conclusion
There is no cultural exception to the GATT. Unlike the norm of
gender equality, the norm of nondiscriminatory open trade is not subor-
dinated to cultural concerns. We might try to explain this inconsistency
by arguing that the trade norm is stronger than the norm of gender
equality. There is a wide consensus among states that nondiscriminatory
open trade maximizes wealth; trade must be governed by rational eco-
nomic forces unencumbered by irrational influences like culture. It is
245. See id. 3.12.
246. See id. 5.6.
247. See id. [5.7.
248. See id. I 5.9(b).
249. See id. 5.17. The W.T.O. Appellate Body affirmed the conclusions in the Panel
Report. See Report of Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/ABIR, AB-1996-2 (adopted October 4, 1996).
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tempting to draw the conclusion that cultural concerns are subordinated
to economic interest.
This hypothesis, however, cannot explain why most other interna-
tional legal norms, including norms that protect non-economic interests,
also trump culture. We have seen that culture does not trump other hu-
man rights norms, like the prohibition against slavery. Indeed, cultural
exceptions to international trade norms fail precisely because they are
regarded as tainted by economic interest. Far from strengthening legal
claims, economic interest undermines the legal arguments of states
claiming cultural exceptions. In part IV below we will see that non-
economic interests in upholding international environmental norms also
trump cultural exceptions.
IV. CULTURAL EXCEPTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS
A. Introduction
International environmental issues often raise cultural exceptions.
Questions about the relative priority to accord different human activities
affecting the environment, plants, or animals necessarily implicate cul-
tural practices. If logging threatens the spotted owl, then a moratorium
on logging will affect how loggers, their families, and communities live.
In the international arena, the cultural issue is compounded by the dif-
ferences in nationality and the close connection between culture and
sovereignty.
The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) has led to a number of disputes between cultural practices and
international environmental norms.25 CITES imposed restrictions on the
import and export of certain flora and fauna contained in one of three
categories of threatened or endangered species.25' The most stringent
restrictions were imposed on species threatened with extinction, which
were contained in Appendix I of the treaty."' Among these species were
the African elephant, most species of rhinoceros, and certain tigers.
CITES restrictions on trade in elephant, rhinoceros, and tiger parts
contradict deeply held cultural beliefs in many Asian societies.5 3 Prod-
ucts from the parts of elephants, rhinoceros, and tigers are greatly
250. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 6, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
251. Id. at art. II.
252. See id. at art. 11(1).
253. See Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1990).
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valued for a variety of cultural uses.254 As the market has bid up the
price for these animal products, the numbers of these species have
dwindled. Elephant tusks, for example, are carved for a number of tra-
ditional decorative objects, including jewelry, knives, and piano keys.255
Many Asian cultures, especially the Chinese and Korean, have devel-
oped folklore and mythology around the power of the Asiatic tiger.256
Some Asian nations believe that tiger parts have medicinal value for
curing laziness, tuberculosis, rabies, asthma, liver disorders, fever, ul-
cers, rheumatism, heart disease, and epilepsy, among other diseases.2 7
These medical practices originated more than 3,000 years ago, and some
Asians consider this use of tiger parts to be deeply rooted in their na-
tional culture.5 8 Some Asian cultures also value the rhinoceros horn,
which can be ground into a medicinal powder. These cultures believe
that the horn can cure high blood pressure, impotence, paralysis, influ-
enza, fever, rashes, insomnia, and eye diseases among other illnesses.
259
Asian cultures also attribute healing power to the meat, bones, penis and
blood of the rhinoceros.2'6
Despite the overwhelming evidence of ancient cultural practices,
trade in these animal products is almost universally outlawed, and most
Asian and African countries have laws implementing CITES.2 6 CITES
contain no cultural exception, and to a surprising degree, even the Gov-
ernments of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, where the cultural uses
are most prevalent, have not insisted upon a cultural exception to
CITES. Other examples discussed below confirm that in general the
international community does not respect claims by states for cultural
exceptions from international environmental norms.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 3.
256. See Joonmoo Lee, Poachers, Tigers and Bears ... Oh My! Asia's Illegal Wildlife
Trade, 16 NW. J. INT. L. & Bus. 497, 498 (1996). According to Korean mythology, the
Korean peninsula was formed by the union of a tiger and a bear. See id. at 511.
257. See Charlene D. Daniel, Evaluating U.S. Endangered Species Legislation-The
Endangered Species Act as an International Example: Can this be Pulled Off? The Case of
the Rhinoceros and Tiger, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 683, 698-99 (1999).
258. See Lee, supra note 256, at 500.
259. See Daniel, supra note 257, at 701.
260. See id. at 701-02.
261. See generally, Daniel, supra note 257; Glennon, supra note 253; Catharine L.
Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species Under CITES: Is it a Sustainable Alterna-
tive?, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461 (1996); Dianne M. Kueck, Using International
Political Agreements to Protect Endangered Species: A Proposed Model, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 345 (1995); Lee, supra note 256; Amy E. Vulpio, From the Forests of Asia to
the Pharmacies of New York City: Searching for a Safe Haven for Rhinos and Tigers, 11
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 463 (1999).
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B. Japanese and Norwegian Whaling
One prominent example of a cultural dispute over endangered spe-
cies concerns whaling. Over the last four centuries whaling has reduced
the population of one sub-species of whale after another to the point
where many sub-species are now endangered. 262 Britain, France, Ger-
many, Japan, the United States, and Russia have all contributed to the
depletion of whale stocks,263 but during the last century, the leading
whaling nation has been Norway.2 6 With the introduction of the har-
poon and the steamship in the late nineteenth century, the Norwegians
began killing blue and humpback whales throughout the North Atlan-
tic. 265 Norway built larger and faster ships capable of chasing whales far
out to sea and processing the whale carcasses on board.26 When the
Norwegians had exhausted the stocks of the North Atlantic, they moved
to the Southern Hemisphere.26' As technology improved, the whaling
industry grew. By the 1940's Norwegian whalers were killing upwards
of 50,000 whales annually.2 68 After an interruption caused by the Second
World War, Japan and the Soviet Union joined Norway as the three
leading whaling nations.269
As early as the 1930's, the international community recognized that
the expansion of whaling threatened to extinguish whale stocks. In
1931, the United States and 25 other whaling nations signed a Conven-
tion for the Regulation of Whaling. 70 That Convention was superseded
in 1937 by the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling.27' In 1946,
262. In the 1600's the growth of whaling in Europe nearly exterminated the North At-
lantic right whale. In the 1700's British, French and German whalers around Greenland
destroyed stocks of Greenland bowhead whales and Biscayan right whales. The expansion of
the U.S. whaling fleet in the 1800's eliminated much of the whale stocks on both the east and
west coasts. U.S. whalers moved their operations to South America and Australia. Whaling
in the United States largely ended by the turn of the century, while commercial whaling in
Norway and Japan was taking off. See Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales:
Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 28-29 (1991).
263. For an excellent history of the impact of these industrialized countries on the de-
pletion of whale stocks, see Harry N. Scheiber, Historical Memory, Cultural Claims and
Environmental Ethics, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, 127-66 (H.N. Scheiber (ed), Kluwer 2000).
264. See Cliff M. Stein, Whales Swim for Their Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a
Norwegian Uniform: An Analysis of Norway's Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 155, 159 (1994).
265. See id. at 160.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 161.
268. See id. at 162.
269. See id. at 163.
270. See Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 155
L.N.T.S. 349.
271. See Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 1937, 52 Stat. 1460, 190
L.N.T.S. 79.
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fifteen states, including the United States and Norway, signed the Inter-
national Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (I.C.R.W.) for the
purpose of protecting whale populations from excessive whaling.272 The
Convention, which came into effect in 1948, established the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission ("I.W.C.") to regulate whaling.273 The
I.W.C. consists of one representative from each member state. 74 The
primary responsibility of the I.W.C. is to promulgate a schedule that
restricts whaling. In 1982, at the urging of Britain, France, the Nether-
lands, and the Seychelles, the I.W.C. adopted a moratorium on whaling.
Japan, Peru, Norway, Iceland, and the Soviet Union opposed the ban,
which passed with overwhelming support.2 75 The I.C.R.W. provided that
any government that files a timely objection to an amendment to the
whaling schedule is exempted from the amendment. 76 Norway, Japan,
and the Soviet Union all objected to the moratorium and were therefore
not legally bound by it. In addition, the I.C.R.W. provided that notwith-
standing any restriction on whaling, a party could authorize its nationals
to engage in whaling for the purposes of "scientific research" subject to
limits imposed by the state party.277
Since then, each year the pro-whaling countries have disregarded
the moratorium while fighting unsuccessfully to overturn it within the
I.W.C. In 1987, Japan announced its intention to conduct scientific re-
search on 300 minke whales. Since then Japan has killed more than
3,000 minke for "scientific research., 278 Environmentalists have ques-
tioned Japan's motives. 7 9 Environmental groups point out that the
number of whales Japan has hunted for scientific research is nearly as
many as the pre-moratorium quota. The same Japanese ships are used
for scientific research as were used for commercial whaling, and whale
meat is still available at high prices in Japanese stores.8 The Japanese
have not been able to explain convincingly why their "research" re-
272. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter I.C.R.W.].
273. See id. at Preamble.
274. See Lawrence Watters and Connie Dugger, The Hunt for Gray Whales: The Di-
lemma of Native American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling, 22
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 319, 327 (1997).
275. See Thirty-fourth Report of the International Whaling Commission, IWC, 34th
mtg. (1982).
276. See I.C.R.W., supra note 272, at art. V.
277. See id. at art. VIII.
278. See William C. Bums, The International Whaling Commission and the Future of
Cetaceans. Problems and Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 31, 47-49 (1997).
279. See Kiyoshi Aihara & Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan Criticized for Scientific Whaling,
THE DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 10, 1995, at 13.
280. Cynthia Taliaferro Bright, The Future of the International Whaling Commission:
Can We Save the Whales?, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 815, 824-25 (1993).
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quires killing 300 minke annually.281 Japan's scientific claim cannot be
taken seriously.
Iceland and Norway also submitted research proposals and contin-
ued whaling. Iceland withdrew from the I.W.C. in 1992 and has refused
to comply with the moratorium.2  Norway briefly ceased whaling in
1991, but in 1993 Norway declared that it would resume whaling of
North Atlantic minke whales. 3 Norway cited scientific reports that in-
dicated that the numbers of minke had increased to the point where they
were no longer endangered by limited hunting. In 1995 and 1996 the
I.W.C. called on Norway to halt all whaling activities and expressed
concern that Norway was secretly selling whale meat to other coun-
tries.
The United States, other member states of the I.W.C., and environ-
mentalists worldwide have applied intense diplomatic and political
pressure to compel Norway and Japan to cease whaling. Fifteen states
have approved a resolution condemning Norway, 25 European consumers
have boycotted Norwegian imports,286 and the United States has
threatened economic sanctions against Norway. 7 Under the Pelly
Amendment to the 1967 Fishermen's Protective Act, the President had
60 days to decide if economic sanctions were appropriate against a
country that has acted to "diminish the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program.""28 Although President Clinton decided
not to take action against Norway, he warned that Norway's actions
were serious enough to justify sanctions and stated that he hoped that by
delaying sanctions, Norway could be persuaded to stop whaling. In
addition, under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the 1976 Fish-
ery Conservation Act,2" the President was required to reduce the
allocation of fish within the U.S. economic zone to any foreign state that
281. See id. at 825-26. See also D'Amato & Chopra, supra 262, at 54-56.
282. See Bums, supra note 278, at 50.
283. See id. at 51.
284. See id. at 153.
285. See President Clinton Delays Whaling Sanctions on Norway, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), at 1678 (Oct. 6, 1993).
286. See Boycott of Norwegian Fish Products Starts in Australia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 16, 1993.
287. See America Considering Import Ban in Norwegian Whaling Protest, Press Asso-
ciation, Newsfile, Aug. 7 1993, available at LEXIS, News.
288. See The Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
289. See President's Message to Congress on Whaling Activities of Norway, 29
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2000 (Oct. 4, 1993).
290. See The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 1812(e)(2)
(1988).
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contravened the international ban on whaling.291' Non-governmental or-
ganizations have organized boycotts against Norway that have cost
292Norway almost $60 million as of 1993, according to some sources z.
Further pressure has been applied by Greenpeace, which has repeatedly
interfered with whaling operations.2 93
Despite worldwide condemnation, economic sanctions, and diplo-
matic pressure, Norway and Japan have continued commercial whaling
operations at approximately the same rate as before the worldwide
moratorium.9 Since 1986, more than 18,000 whales have been killed.295
While Japan and Norway are not technically violating the Convention,
they are clearly contravening the spirit of the I.C.R.W. Arguably, the
willingness of other whaling nations to submit to the I.W.C.'s regula-
tions, and the overwhelming international public support for a whaling
ban, have established a generalized norm (not quite customary law) that
disfavors whaling. In response, the Japanese and Norwegians have felt
compelled to defend their position as if they were arguing for a cultural
exception from a legal norm.
There are two kinds of arguments supporting the whaling morato-
rium. First, the anti-whaling nations claim that whaling stocks are
dangerously low, and certain whales, particularly minke in the North
Atlantic, are endangered. In fact, there is a legitimate scientific dispute
as to whether minke whales in the North Atlantic remain scarce. Some
whaling countries have insisted that minke whales are neither endan-
gered nor threatened based upon the I.W.C.'s own data. 96 The estimates
of whale populations and growth are unreliable,29 ' and data is difficult to
291. In actuality no sanctions were applied under Packwood-Magnuson. See Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (interpreting the amend-
ment to allow the Secretary of Commerce to use his discretion in certifying sanctions against
a foreign state). No fishing limits have been imposed against either Japan or Norway.
292. See Boycott of Norwegian Fish Products Starts in Australia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 16, 1993; Economic Sanctions Needed to Halt Norwegian Whaling, Environ-
mentalists Say, INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA), (Nov. 19, 1992); Howton, supra note 3, at 191-
92.
293. See Stein, supra note 264, at 180-83.
294. See On the Menu?: A Compromise for Whales, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1997, at
48 [hereinafter "On the Menu"].
295. See Ban Divides Whaling Commission, AP ONLINE, May 19, 1998.
296. Dylan A. MacLeod, International Consequences of Norway's Decision to Allow
the Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling, 6-SPG Int'l Legal Persp. 131, 132 (1994).
There is an argument that the whaling moratorium is based on poor scientific evidence. See
William Aron, William Burke and Milton Freeman, Flouting the Convention, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, May 1999.
297. See Bums, supra note 278, at 54-64. Estimates of whales are based upon very
rough data. Only a small number of species are actually counted, and such counts are often
inaccurate. Survey methodologies assume a relatively equal distribution of whales and do
not take into account the possibility that there may be unusual concentrations of whales at
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interpret because the gender and age of the whales is not obvious even
211
after the whales are captured. Whaling States point to a 1991 report by
the Scientific Committee of the I.W.C., which estimated that there are
about 87,000 minke in the northeast Atlantic, 760,000 in the Antarctic,
and 25,000 in the North Pacific. 9 The Norwegians have claimed that
they could hunt 2,000 minke annually without depleting the population;
Norwegian fleets hunt only about 1,000 minke whales annually.3°°
Second, leaving aside the question whether these whales are in fact
endangered, the United States and other countries have opposed whaling
in part for cultural and humanitarian reasons.30 ' For example, the late
U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown dismissed scientific evidence
that there were sufficient whale stocks to sustain hunting. He argued
that "scientific advice, while essential, ;is not the only factor which
should be considered in managing resources. Other factors, such as
cultural traditions, are also important. '30 2 Many environmentalists and
philosophers have argued that whales are highly intelligent creatures
and that it is immoral to destroy another highly intelligent mammal. In
the memorable words of one environmentalist:3 3
To look upon commercial whaling with approval seems to be
like looking with approval on a hoard of cunning but illiterate
certain times and places. Moreover, the most common method, transect surveying, assumes
that the whales are stationary and that all whales along the trackline are detected. Neither of
these assumptions is generally accurate. Estimates may be as much as 50% above or below
the actual number of whales as a result of these inaccuracies. See id.
298. The pro-whaling countries insist that the I.W.C. should rely solely on scientific
estimates of whale populations. Some argue that continuing to protect whale populations
may create an ecological imbalance. See Mark Derr, To Whale or Not to Whale, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Oct. 1997. This conflict has threatened the legitimacy of the I.W.C. See generally
David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine
Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 154 (1995).
299. 41st Report of the International Whaling Commission, at 64 (1991); See also
Burns, supra note 278, at 50.
300. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Tokyo Persists with Bid to Lift Whaling Ban, Inter Press
Service online Nov. 13, 1997.
301. See Scheiber, supra note 263, at 139-42.
302. Bruce Fein, Minke Endangering Free Trade?, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 15,
1995, at A18.
303. See J. Baird Callicott, Whaling in Sand County: A Dialectical Hunt for Land Ethi-
cal Answers to Questions About the Morality of Norwegian Minke Whale Catching, 8 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 22-25 (1997). Rep. Gerry Studds introduced a resolution
opposing commercial whaling, which passed the House in February 1993. H.R. Con. Res.
34, 103d Cong. (1993). Rep. Studds defended the resolution, arguing, "commercial whaling
is an anachronism, No other group of animals has so captured the imagination of the Ameri-
can people ... yet, no other group of animals has been subject to such relentless hunting for
profit. Commercial whaling must be stopped." 139 Cong. Rec. E270 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1993)(Statement of Rep. Studds).
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vandals looting and plundering the art galleries and libraries of
an ancient and peaceful civilization in the name of gathering
fuel for cooking fires? U
This moral position is defended by some scientists based on physical
and behavioral evidence. According to some scientists, the whale's
brain is about six-times larger and more powerful than the human
brain.05 There is controverted evidence that whales have a sophisticated
language that appears to include "abstruse mathematical poetry,"3°6 a
sense of humor, an ability to communicate with other species, such as
dolphins, and highly evolved communities. 7 For these reasons, some
argue that whales should be considered sentient moral beings entitled to
humanitarian protection under international law. °8 Some environmen-
talists argue that killing whales is morally equivalent to genocide.3°9
Norway rejects the argument that whales are more highly evolved
mammals. Norwegian officials negate scientific arguments about the
intelligence and social instincts of whales and compare whaling to
slaughtering cows.30 Just as Indians view cows as sacred, the United
States and other anti-whaling countries are attributing to whales char-
acteristics that reflect cultural values. By characterizing this debate as a
clash of two cultural values, Norway and Japan hope to weaken the le-
gitimacy of the norm disfavoring whaling.
Norway and Japan view whaling as an essential aspect of their na-
tional culture dating back centuries. They advance three kinds of
arguments in defense of whaling. First, both governments argue that if
whaling ceased small whaling communities, which have survived gen-
erations, would be displaced and a traditional way of life would be
304. See Callicott, supra note 303, at 25.
305. See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 262, at 21.
306. See id. at 21.
307. See id. at 22 (citing J. LILLY, THE MIND OF THE DOLPHIN: A NONHUMAN INTEL-
LIGENCE (1967) and BUNNELL, THE EVOLUTION OF CETACEAN INTELLIGENCE, IN MIND IN
THE WATERS 52 (J. McIntyre ed. 1974)).
308. See id. at 61.
309. See David Andrew Price, Save the Whalers, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Feb.
1995, at 32. In an open letter to the Norwegian people in 1993, Sea Shepherd President Paul
Watson wrote, "The whales will talk about you in the same vein as Jews now talk of Nazis.
For in the eyes of whalekind, there is little difference between the behavior of the monsters
of the Reich and the monsters behind the harpoon." Id. at 34. Arguments that whales are
exceptional are strongly disputed. See, e.g., Aron et al., supra note 296.
310. See Howton, supra note 3, at 180. "You treat whales like the Indians treat cows-
as if they are sacred-the Norwegians tell their critics. For they believe that there is nothing
god-like about the whale ... why should they be treated in any way different from fish?"
Elizabeth Buie, Why the Whale is in Deep Trouble, THE HERALD (GLASGOW), Feb. 11, 1995,
at 16.
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lost."' In Japan, for example, only four whaling villages remain after
many centuries of whale hunting. Within these coastal villages, highly
specialized workers use every part of the whale carcass for food prod-
ucts, insecticide, fertilizer, tools, and leather. ' 2 In Norway, there are
about 150 families remaining that have been whaling for many genera-
tions.3 3 If whaling ceased, the whalers, their families, and other
industries that support whaling would be affected.
This first set of cultural arguments for protecting whaling commu-
nities parallels the claim raised by the Japanese Government on behalf
of the Dowa leather workers discussed in part 111. 3 4' In both cases, an
insular community with a traditional way of life is threatened by foreign
influence. What distinguishes these two examples is their relative
power. The Dowa are disadvantaged by immutable characteristics that
have subjected them to discrimination for centuries in Japanese soci-
ety.3 " The Japanese regard leather working as a dirty occupation. The
Dowa probably do not seek to preserve their traditional subordinate po-
sition in Japan. The Dowa probably would prefer to pursue other
professions, if they had the choice. In contrast, Japanese and Norwegian
whalers are not defined by an immutable characteristic and suffer no
particular discrimination or disadvantage. Indeed, they enjoy a special
status as cultural icons. They have chosen their profession and find sat-
isfaction in preserving their heritage. It is unclear whether the Dowa
cultural claim is stronger because it is morally justified to protect a dis-
advantaged group, or whether the whaler's cultural claim is stronger
because it is genuinely intended to protect a valued and historic aspect
of the national heritage. In any event, the international community has
rejected both cultural claims as inauthentic.
Second, Japan and Norway claim that whaling is an historical link
to their seafaring past. In this regard, whaling should be preserved not
merely to maintain a small insular community, but more importantly, to
preserve a part of the nation's heritage. Americans are familiar with this
cultural argument. Americans prize the idea of the family farm as a re-
minder of our agrarian origins. We protect farmers in part because we
311. See Scheiber, supra note 263, at 147.
312. Milton M.R. Freeman, A Review of Documents on Small-Type Whaling, Submit-
ted to the International Whaling Commission by the Government of Japan, 1986-95, I.W.C.
Workshop on Japanese Community-based Whaling, March 18-21, 1997; MASAMI IWASAKI-
GOODMAN AND MILTON M.R. FREEMAN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WHALING
IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: A CASE STUDY OF SMALL-TYPE COASTAL WHALING IN KEY IS-
SUES IN HUNTER-GATHERER RESEARCH, 377, 377-391 (Ernest S. Burch, Jr. and Linda J.
Ellanna eds., 1994).
313. See On the Menu?, supra note 294.
314. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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believe that farming represents something virtuous in our nation's tradi-
tions. It does not seem to matter that less than three percent of
Americans farm, or that the mythology of the family farm bears little
resemblance to the reality of modern agri-business. Nevertheless, such
myths often contribute to a sense of national identity. Similarly, the
continuation of whaling is a living reminder of a simpler time and the
sea's influence on shaping the Norwegian or Japanese national experi-
ence.
Of course, whaling in the 1990's does not look anything like whaling
in the eighteenth century. The industry has become more capital-intensive
utilizing modem ships, advanced harpoons, and on-board factories to
process the whale carcass more efficiently than traditional techniques.
Still, the majority of Japanese and Norwegians who do not whale treasure
some distant idealized memory of what whaling once was. The mythology
of whaling, especially for Norwegians, is a source of national pride.316
Third, Japan and Norway assert that whale meat is itself an impor-
tant aspect of their respective cultures. In both countries whale meat is
considered a special delicacy eaten on holidays and given as gifts.37
Eating whale meat is more than a dietary preference in Japan. It also
reflects the emotional and cultural significance that the Japanese attrib-
ute to special occasions."' Japanese exchange whale meat as part of the
ritual of special events and holidays, particularly at weddings, local fes-
tivals, and new years. The Japanese typically prepare special ceremonial
dishes for each of these occasions." 9 The Japanese also insist that they use
every part of the whale. For example, the baleens of right whales are used
to make puppets for Japan's traditional puppet theater, "Bunraku. '32 °
Similarly, for Norwegians a ban on whale meat would be analogous to a
ban on turkey at Thanksgiving.' Whale meat is a central feature of
Christmas and New Years feasts in Norway. Whaling countries de-
316. See Callicott, supra note 303, at 2.
317. See Kakuchi, supra note 300. The Japanese taste for whale meat is relatively re-
cent. Until World War II whale meat was not an important food source. During the postwar
period, when other forms of protein were scarce, the Japanese relied on whale meat for pri-
mary school lunches. The postwar generation of Japanese thus grew up with a strong taste
for whale meat. While whale meat was largely distributed through the informal economy as
gifts in traditional Japan, today whale meat sells for about $40 per kilogram.
318. See Sumi, supra note 4, at 318.
319. See IWASAKI-GOODMAN, supra note 312, at 385-87.
320. See Sumi, supra note 4, at 341.
321. "When you criticize the food people eat, that's an attack on culture." Arne Kal-
land, University of Oslo anthropologist as quoted by Walter Gibbs, Why Norway Puts Whale
on Menu: The Season which Ended July 31, Yielded a Record Hapvest, Defying World Ban.,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 11, 1997, 1997 WL 2803107.
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nounce U.S. "cultural imperialism" for telling them not to eat whale
meat. 322
Like the Canadian case discussed in part III, the whaling debate pits
a soft international norm against a soft cultural exception. The Norwe-
gians and the Japanese, like the Canadians, want to preserve certain
distinguishing cultural features that they believe strengthen national
identity. The United States and most of the international community
regard the cultural exception for whaling (or magazines) as a transparent
disguise for economic protection.
The whaling example differs from the Canadian magazine case in
certain key respects. Unlike the Canadian case, the Japanese and Nor-
wegians do not face a competitive importer. The Canadian periodical
ban benefited the Canadian magazines at the expense of U.S. magazine
competitors. By characterizing Canada's interest as "economic," the
GATT Panel ignored the cultural interest Canada asserted. The United
States complained to the W.T.O. that Canada had impaired the eco-
nomic benefits the United States had bargained for under the national
treatment provision of the GATT. In other words, GATT dispute settle-
ment operated to process the conflicting private economic interests with
the result that public free trade norms were reaffirmed.
In contrast, Japan and Norway are not hurting U.S. competitors by
continuing to whale. The U.S. opposition to whaling is based on a
genuine concern about whales. We could say that the United States has
a "pure" (non-economic) motive in seeking to protect whales as op-
posed to the U.S. interest in opening the Canadian market for Time, Inc.
If we then characterize the U.S. motive altruistically, does that weaken
or strengthen the U.S. position? Arguably, the United States here is af-
firming the international legal norm based on a genuine commitment to
preserving the global commons. On the other hand, we might question
whether the United States really has standing to protect whales. If
whaling does not directly hurt the United States economically, the U.S.
economic threats against Norway might look like an unjustifiable inter-
ference into Norway's domestic affairs.
In short, the private economic interests vindicated in the Canadian
case do not exist here. The whaling debate could be described as a con-
flict between a public interest in protecting the global environment and
either Norway's (Japan's) public interest in preserving cultural practices
or Norway's (Japan's) private interest in protecting a local industry. To
the extent that we characterize Norway's (Japan's) interest as private or
322. See T. R. Reid, World Whaling Body Riven by Dispute; Norway Threatens to End
Moratorium, WASH. POST, May 15, 1993, at A17; Japanese Rally for Hunting of Whales,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at C4.
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economic, the cultural exception appears less persuasive. By contrast,
the U.S. claim against whaling may be more or less persuasive because
of the absence of a private or economic interest.
The whaling debate is not merely a conflict between the cultural
claims of Japan and Norway and the.I.W.C. It may be characterized as a
clash of two competing cultural claims. The United States, Europe, and
the other anti-whaling countries assert that whales are unlike other
mammals that we regularly use as a food source. The idea that whales,
like dolphins, are different reflects popular culture. For example, the
U.S. film "Free Willy," which featured a whale, was promoted based
upon the close relationship between humans and whales. The film's
distributor advertised that "[w]hales are majestic, gentle, warm-blooded
mammals that mate for life, travel in family groups, feel pain, and are in-
credibly intelligent." '323 In other words, whales have good family values.
To the extent that Japan and Norway are successful in characterizing the
U.S. claim as merely cultural bias, the U.S. claim looks weaker. If the
whaling controversy is merely a cultural contest between two different
cultural attitudes, the U.S. cultural claim is no stronger than the Nor-
weigan cultural claim.
While the whaling question remains contested, the international
community has ostracized Norway and Japan for hunting whales. Both
countries have voluntarily limited their quotas of whales and have felt
compelled to justify their actions at every opportunity. Other countries
are unlikely to begin whaling because of international opposition. We
might conclude from this evidence that the international environmental
norm disfavoring whaling appears to have trumped the argument for a
cultural exception. In fact, the relationship between cultural claims and
international environmental norms is subtler than that.
C. Indigenous Nations
States have acknowledged some de minimis cultural claims by in-
digenous tribal nations against international norms protecting endangered
species. Whether that practice evidences a cultural exception is not alto-
gether clear. The difficulty of characterizing or defining culture means
that sometimes one cannot distinguish a cultural exception from another
claim masquerading as a cultural exception. One can debate whether a
claim by indigenous tribes for the right to whale derives from cultural,
legal, or economic considerations.
323. Mari Skate, Whaling: A Sustainable Use of Natural Resources or a Violation of
Animal Rights?, 36 ENVIRONMENT 12, 13 (1994) (quoting Warner Bros. Family Entertain-
ment, handout distributed after movie showings in San Francisco, California in 1993).
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The I.W.C. authorized member states to petition on behalf of abo-
riginal groups for an exception from the whaling schedule. 4 Under the
so-called "aboriginal subsistence exemption," permission may be
granted for a limited number of hunts. The Inuit, of arctic Canada,
Alaska,. Greenland, and ,Siberia, for example, have an exemption that
permitted them to hunt limited number of gray and .bowhead whales.
The bowhead has remained an endangered species, but the exemption
was granted because the Inuit hunt only for subsistence. The I.W.C. re-
garded Inuit hunting of bowhead whales as consistent with sustainable
development."5 Some environmental groups like the Sierra Club and the
Friends of the Earth did not object to allowing the Inuit to hunt an en-
dangered species of whale. Apparently, these groups deferred out of
respect for the rights of indigenous groups.326 The silence of some envi-
ronmental watchdogs evidences the strength that the cultural claim can
exert. The case of the Makah nation offers a striking comparison to the
cultural claims made by Norway and Japan.
The 1,700-member Makah, a Native American tribe in Neah Bay,
Washington State, had hunted gray whales for centuries. In 1855 the
Makah conveyed certain land to the Federal Government and agreed to
relocate to a reservation in exchange for a treaty that acknowledged
their right to fish and hunt whales and seals.327 Commercial whaling ex-
hausted the gray whale population around the turn of the century, and as
a result, the Makah ceased whaling more than 75 years ago.328 The loss
of a primary industry hurt the tribal economy. 9 As unemployment and
poverty increased, many Makah believed that without whaling the
community lacked social cohesion or purpose.33 Unemployment, crime,
substance abuse, and related social problems increased.' Even after 75
years, the whale remains a central symbol of Makah culture, and its im-
age appears on buildings, ships, and clothing.332
324. See Scheiber, supra note 263, at 142-44.
325. See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 262, at 57-59.
326. See id. at 58.
327. See Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855 <http://www.geocities.com/yosemite/7431/
treaty.htm>.
328. See Watters and Dugger, supra note 274, at 323.
329. See id. at 324.
330. See id.
331. See id. Unemployment on the Makah reservation ranges from 50-70%. See id.
Household income averages $7,000 annually. See id. Substance abuse and crime are wide-
spread. See id. Some Makah also believe that the loss of whale meat in their daily diet
caused malnutrition and related health problems. See This Was One Expensive Meal: The
Aboriginal-Green Alliance Is Shattered By The Makah Whale Hunt, ALBERTA REPORT, June
14, 1999, at 21-22.
332. See Peggy Andersen; One Tribal Whale Hunt, Two Opposing Views of it Success,
THE OREGONIAN, May 24, 1999, at Ell.
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Since the international whaling moratorium, the population of gray
whale has increased, and it is no longer listed as an endangered species.
As the conditions of the gray whale have improved, some Makah argued
that the U.S. Government could not justifiably perpetuate a ban on
whaling by the tribe. Other Makah believed that regardless of the envi-
ronmental circumstances, the tribe should respect the whale and protect
it from extinction. Within the tribe this issue was debated fiercely. After
the tribal leaders chose to pursue the right to whale, the tribe in 1994
asked the Federal Government for permission to resume whaling under
the treaty.333
The United States petitioned the I.W.C. to exempt the Makah.3
Some member states expressed concern that granting the exemption to
the Makah, after nearly a century of no whaling, would trigger a land-
slide of demands from other indigenous groups.335 For example, 13 other
Canadian tribes also sought exemptions.336 Overcoming these concerns,
the Commission granted the exemption to allow the Makah to hunt five
California gray whales per year for subsistence and ceremonial pur-
poses. Japan and Norway objected that the I.W.C. was applying a
double standard. 37 Other anti-whaling nations supported the exemption
for the Makah, even while they opposed a cultural exemption for Japan
or Norway.
In 1999, the tribe conducted its first whale hunt. Unlike the Japa-
nese or Norwegian whalers, none of the tribe who participated had any
experience of whaling. Few members of the tribe had ever tasted whale
meat or remembered any ceremonies connected to whaling.338 The
Makah did not rely on traditional hunting methods in resuming hunting.
In order to kill their first whale, the Makah used motorized boats, steel
harpoons, and a .50-caliber armor-piercing assault rifle designed to de-
stroy tanks. The cost of this modern technology was underwritten by a
$310,000 grant from the U.S. Commerce Department.33 9 Arguably, these
facts may suggest that the whale hunt was not authentically traditional.
Conversely, it might seem unfair if the I.W.C. had restricted the Makah
to using only traditional whaling techniques.
333. See Scheiber, supra note 263, at 162
334. See Watters and Dugger, supra note 274, at 332-38.
335. See id. at 337.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 321-22.
338. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After the Hunt, Bitter Protest and Salty Blubber, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A14. "It's not like we have a bunch of favorite recipes to work
with,' said [one whaler], 'This may be an ancient tradition, but it's all new to us." Id.
339. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Reviving Tradition, Tribe Kills a Whale, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1999, at A 18.
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The Makah celebrated the killing of their first whale as a return to
their traditions. The hunter who threw the first harpoon declared that,
"This is about a great tradition. It's about calling out to our ancestors.
It's all about who we are as a people. 3 40 The hunt "restores a missing
link in our heritage," according to one of the tribal leaders. "This is a
great day for the Makah Nation," said another. Another tribal member
added, "This brings meaning and purpose back to the Makah men. For
70 years, they had what they did best taken away from them. 34'
Why should the Makah's cultural claim be considered more authen-
tic than Japan's or Norway's? In recent years, many indigenous nations
have used cultural exceptions effectively in a variety of contexts to
protect their interests and expand group rights under international law.42
We might assume that an indigenous tribe has a traditional form of
whaling that is more primitive than the modem techniques used by Ja-
pan and Norway or that the tribe has practiced whaling continuously for
a longer period. However, the strength of the Makah's cultural claim
clearly is not a function of authenticity or longevity. All three cultures
use whale meat for some ceremonial purposes, but Norway and Japan
have had a continuous tradition of eating whale meat."3 By contrast, the
Makah had never tasted whale meat and had no clear idea of what to do
with the whale carcass after they killed it.3"
A second possible distinction is that the Makah hunting is limited to
a sustainable level.' 5 The Makah will only hunt 20 grey whales over
five years, whereas Japan hunts 300 minke annually. This distinction is
not entirely persuasive, either. As a percentage of the total whale popu-
lation, the Japanese quota is half the percentage of the Makah quota, and
grey whales are still considerably scarcer than minke.3 Moreover, as
340. Verhovek, supra note 338, at A14.
341. Verhovek, supra note 339, at A18.
342. See generally Engle, supra note 9, at 303-310. Whereas state actors have claimed
cultural exceptions to justify limiting gender equality under international law, indigenous
nations have deployed cultural claims to establish international groups' rights. See id. at
294-95, 303-10.
343. See Aron et al., supra note 296.
344. See David Usborne, Whale Gives Indians a Taste of Their Heritage, THE INDE-
PENDENT (LONDON), May 19, 1999. The owner of the Makah Maiden Diner told reporters,
"I'll make a whale of a burger .... Verhovek, supra note 338.
345. The I.W.C. established the aboriginal subsistence quota of grey whales at 140 an-
nually, but most of these are hunted by the Russian Chukchi, an Inuit tribe on the Russian
coast. Other Inuit tribes have been permitted to hunt bowhead whales, which are still listed
on the endangered species list. Thus, granting the Makah the right to hunt 20 whales over
five years is consistent with the I.W.C.'s policies toward aboriginal groups. See Watters and
Dugger, supra note 274 at 335-36.
346. Accepting the figures the I.W.C. has reported, there are 750,000 minke and only
25,000 grey whales. Japan hunts .0004% of the minke annually, and the Makah will hunt
.0008 percent of the grey whales over five years.
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was discussed above, the whaling ban is only partly a function of the
scarcity of whales. Many believe that whales simply should not be
killed because of their intellect.
47
Third, we cannot distinguish tribal "subsistence" hunting from
"commercial" hunting. Obviously, the Makah do not need whale meat to
"subsist," since they have lived without it for generations. If subsistence
implies that the tribe will use the meat itself and will not resell it, it is
unclear what the tribe intends. Some authorities have argued for a broad
definition of subsistence that would include selling whale meat to pro-
vide financial support for the community. The Makah have said that
they have no plans to sell whale meat on the Asian market, where a sin-
gle gray whale is worth up to $500,000. 34 9 However, the I.W.C. does not
prohibit the tribe from selling whale meat, and it is clear that the tribe
itself does not have a "taste" for whale. Granted that the tribe has suf-
fered economically, it seems only a matter of time before the Makah
begin selling to the Asian market. Indeed, some tribal elders placed a
newspaper ad opposing the whale hunt in which they stated "we think
the word 'subsistence' is the wrong thingto say when our people ha-
ven't used or had whale meat/blubber since the early 1900's. For these
,,150reasons, we believe that the hunt is only for the money.
It is arguable that the Makah's claim is distinguishable based on
their treaty rights with the U.S. Government and the sense of responsi-
bility that the United States has for the condition of the Makah. 5 ' Article
IV of the treaty provides, "The right of taking fish and of whaling or
sealing at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured
to said Indians in common with all citizens of the United States ...
Normally, we would read the first sentence to mean that the tribe is en-
titled to national treatment. In other words, the plain language appears
to say that the tribe has the same rights to fish, whale and seal-no more
and no less-as U.S. citizens. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted essentially the same language in another Indian treaty
granting fishing rights to mean that even if other U.S. citizens are pro-
hibited from fishing, the tribe may not be denied the right to catch at
347. See supra note 300-308 and accompanying text.
348. See Scheiber, supra note 263, at 144-45.
349. See Verhovek, supra note 339.
350. Watters and Dugger, supra note 274, at 332-35 (citing PENINSULA DAILY NEWS,
June 16, 1996).
351. In fact, there was considerable opposition to the Makah within Congress. The
House Committee on Resources approved a resolution opposing the Makah's petition in
order to protect the gray whale. See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Congres-
sional Panel Approves Metcalf Resolution Opposing Gray Whale Hunt (June 26, 1996).
352. Treaty with the Makah Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, art. IV, 12 Stat. 939.
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least some quantity of fish.353 Assuming that the treaty does guarantee
the tribe's right to whale unequivocally, the treaty only binds the United
States. The treaty cannot explain why the I.W.C. found the tribal claim
more compelling than the claims of Japan or Norway.
International law has only recently recognized the rights of indige-
nous peoples, and there are no binding international conventions that
establish the right of indigenous peoples to hunt.3"4 There is some evi-
dence of emerging international customary norms protecting the rights
and interests of indigenous populations.355 Nevertheless, there is no spe-
cific binding international convention, that guarantees the rights of
indigenous peoples to hunt or fish.356 It is probably too early in the devel-
opment of this norm to conclude that it supercedes other international
environmental norms. However, one might argue that the I.W.C.'s will-
ingness to accept an aboriginal claim, is itself evidence of a norm that
privileges some claims of indigenous groups over others.
Likewise, there is a strong ethical argument that the United States is
morally bound to protect the rights and interests of indigenous nations.
One might argue that the U.S. Government has a moral, if not quite le-
gal, duty to provide restitution to the descendants of the tribal nations it
destroyed and oppressed."5 However compelling such a moral claim
might be, it can only explain the actions of the U.S. Government in
seeking an exception for the Makah, but again, it cannot explain why
other governments have concurred.
We might accept the argument that the U.S. Government's request
for an exemption for the Makah's whaling was based upon the treaty
353. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979). See generally WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 419-38 (3d ed. 1998).
354. See generally Chris Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and
the International Legal Literature from 1945-1993, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 1 (1994) (tracing the
shifting representation of indigenous peoples from the International Labor Organization's
early efforts to protect them to the contemporary U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations).
355. International law is developing toward the recognition and protection of the rights
and interests of indigenous populations. Examples include the I.L.O. Convention No. 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989), the General
Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities (1992), and the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
which was adopted the Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and is now before
the U.N. Human Rights Commission for adoption. See generally Benedict Kingshury,
"Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Contro-
versy, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 414 (1998).
356. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996).
357. See generally Scheiber, supra note 263, at 163-66.
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rights of the Makah, international customary norms, or moral obliga-
tions. However, these arguments do not evidence support for a cultural
exception to international law. They do suggest possible explanations
for why U.S. policymakers regarded the Makah's claim to hunt whales
as legally or morally superior to the claims of Norway and Japan.
Perhaps what distinguishes the Makah's claim in the view of the
international community is the tribe's economic dependency. The
Makah have documented the effect of the whaling ban on their em-
ployment and economy. The loss of jobs associated with whaling had a
devastating impact on the Makah. By contrast, neither the economies of
Norway nor Japan is significantly dependent on whaling.
The Makah may be a more sympathetic claimant for a whaling ex-
emption because the reservation lacks any significant industry. The
authenticity of the Makah nation's cultural claim here may be a function
of the degree of its economic interest. This analysis, however, would
seem to contradict the general observation that cultural claims are disre-
garded when there is any taint of a disguised economic interest. It is
merely because of the relative size of the whaling industry that the
Makah have a stronger claim. Even if whaling were a more significant
industrial sector in Japan, it is hard to imagine that the degree of Japan's
economic interest alone would justify granting an exemption for whal-
ing. What truly distinguishes the Makah is the conjunction of their
economic dependence and their aboriginal status.358 The rhetoric of
"aboriginal subsistence" transforms an argument about economic self-
interest into an assertion of cultural sovereignty.
The prevailing idea of "culture" is itself a product of the relation-
ship between developed industrialized European societies and less
developed societies. Often, we use the term "culture" when we are dis-
cussing less developed societies, and sometimes we describe these as
"primitive" cultures. The idea of the primitive and the idea of culture
are closely linked. The use of the term "aboriginal" is also closely re-
lated to the term, "primitive." Aboriginal cultures are contrasted with
developed or civilized cultures. The I.W.C. granted the Makah an
"aboriginal subsistence" exception. Characterizing the Makah whaling
culture in this way reinforces the stereotype that the Makah are seen as
358. See generally Scheiber, supra note 263, at 153-66. Professor Scheiber argues that
the Makah are in fact a victim of the destruction of whale stocks during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries by industrialized countries and the occupation of their lands by Europe-
ans. In his view, the indigenous nations have a stronger moral claim to resume whaling than
do the coastal whaling communities of Norway and Japan, which have indirectly shared in
the benefits of modernization and industrialization. See id. at 164-66.
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"primitive."359 The cultural exception is not a measure then of the re-
spect owed to the tribal nations. Rather, the cultural exception in a sense
is a double-edged sword. The use of the cultural exception here bolsters
the idea that the tribe is dependent, "primitive", and subordinate. The
status relationship between the Makah and the United States is more a
product of U.S. and European cultural stereotyping of tribal nations than
it is a function of traditional tribal culture. It is only a cultural exception
in the sense that the Makah are culturally excepted from the United
States.
This analysis also helps to explain why the Japanese and Norwegian
whaling claims have not prevailed against the international environ-
mental norm. Modern industrialized societies like Japan and Norway are
not seen as culturally distinctive. Indeed, in the same way that we do not
consciously acknowledge an American culture, so, too, we may not see
modem economies like Japan and Norway as having a "culture." At
least, we do not use the term "culture" to describe Norway, in the same
sense that we use that term to describe indigenous tribes. In sum, the
cultural exception in this case reinforces existing power relations be-
tween the tribe and the United States.
D. Summary
We saw above that cultural exceptions are effective as against cer-
tain international norms protecting women, children, and sexual
minorities. The cultural claim proved ineffective as an exception to the
free trade norm, however. Instinctively, we may draw the conclusion
that economic interests trump the cultural claims. In the environmental
context, however, the strong cultural claims of Japan and Norway fail,
and they are not trumped by any countervailing economic interest. The
I.W.C. is acting not out of an economic interest in whaling, but a genu-
ine (even if culturally biased) concern for protecting whales. Moreover,
the de minimis exception granted for the Makah is not truly based on the
cultural practices of the Makah; rather, it is a balance struck in light of
the "aboriginal" status of the tribe between the Makah's economic needs
and the global community's interest. The Makah case raises a question
about when an economic interest, recharacterized as a cultural interest,
may trump an international norm.
359. See Tennant, supra note 354 at 4-11 (discussing the use of the term "primitive"
and showing how legal representations have reinforced the lower status of indigenous
groups).
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V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURE AND THE GENDER
EQUALITY NORM
A. Cultural Exceptions Facilitate Globalization
I have mapped out three examples of how public international law
manages cultural resistance. This discussion showed that the interna-
tional community generally characterizes resistance to gender equality
as authentically cultural and tolerates cultural exceptions to that
international norm. By contrast, the international community generally
does not recognize arguments against international trade or environ-
mental norms as authentically cultural (except possibly arguments
regarding indigenous nations). As a result, the international community
dismisses cultural exceptions to trade and environmental norms. What
explains the community's willingness to tolerate cultural exceptions to
international gender norms? My hypothesis is that the effectiveness of
cultural exceptions in international legal discourse is a function of
globalization: the international community does not tolerate cultural
exceptions to free trade or environmental norms that obstruct globaliza-
tion, but it does permit cultural exceptions that facilitate globalization.
How then does a cultural exception that permits gender discrimination
facilitate globalization?
Today, globalization is dramatically changing our experience of na-
tionality.160 As Americans, we have unlimited access to foreign films,
music, and foods. We can enter and leave most countries freely, and the
transactional costs of travel and communication are low enough that
most Americans can experience foreign cultures directly. The emer-
gence of cultural phenomena like fusion music and cuisine, the world
wide web, satellite television, and the spread of English create new
cultural forms that are not identified with any one nation.
Even more fundamentally, globalization is changing the nature of
sovereignty. As states lower barriers to trade in goods and services, lib-
eralize economic regulations on currency and investment, privatize
government-owned industry, and reduce the public sector, states are
conceding control over their economies to the international market.
3 61
Even the United States Government has only a marginal ability to influ-
ence domestic employment, prices, and investment. Exchange rates,
foreign demand for U.S. products, shifts in oil production and pricing,
360. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999).
361. See GREIDER, supra note 25, at 227-58.
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multinationals, and currency traders may affect jobs, inflation and pro-
ductivity in the United States as much or more than federal programs."'
As states lose a sense of their national identity and their economic
sovereignty, the power to impose certain social controls becomes one of
the chief means of expressing state authority. Neither voters nor politi-
cians believe that our national economic destiny is wholly in our own
hands. Social questions, however, can be addressed and controlled at the
national level. Our national politics reflect the reality of our diminished
control over the economy. Recent elections in the United States have
focused attention on social issues like abortion, homosexual rights, and
the relationship of church and state. Candidates debate whether the state
can require a woman to notify her spouse before she obtains an abortion,
deny recognition to a same-sex marriage, prosecute flag burning, post
the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, or outlaw the
teaching of evolution. The intensity of these social issues reflects the
level of anxiety that Americans feel toward globalization. We respond
to the loss of control over our economic destiny by asserting greater
control over our schools, neighbors, and social institutions.
The Chilean experience is a good example of the way that globali-
zation triggers cultural resistance to gender equality. Chile is the model
for a successful transition from a highly regulated underdeveloped
closed economy to a rapid-growth globalized economy. Since Chile re-
moved barriers to trade and investment, it has made impressive strides
in re-establishing democracy and protecting civil rights. It has also safe-
guarded the rights of women to equal employment opportunities. Yet,
the influx of foreign trade and capital has corresponded with a fierce
cultural backlash against further progress for women in the home. Chile
has maintained and even strengthened some of the most restrictive laws
in the hemisphere concerning the rights of women to control their re-
production and to obtain a divorce. In international fora, Chile is among
362. Consider for example that in 2000 only 19 percent of the federal budget is spent
on all non-military discretionary domestic and foreign programs. Moreover, the total federal
budget in 2000, approximately $1.8 trillion, is roughly equal to the amount of currency
traded on world markets in three days. See <www.usbudget.gov>; GREIDER, supra note 25,
at 245. The central banks of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and Swit-
zerland in 1992 held about $278 billion in foreign-exchange reserves, while the international
currency market traded more than twice that amount, $623 billion daily. See GREIDER, supra
note 25, at 245. Also, consider the relative size of the gross domestic products of major
countries to the capital values of major multinationals. In 1999, for example, the gross do-
mestic products of Spain, Ukraine, Argentina, South Africa, Iran and Thailand were roughly
equal to the market capitalization of Microsoft, Merck, Wal-Mart, Lucent Technologies,
Cisco Systems and General Electric, respectively. See Gretchen Morgenson, A Company
Worth More than Spain?, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1999.
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the most outspoken opponents of gender equality in the domestic
sphere.
Throughout the world, globalization challenges sovereignty and
triggers widespread cultural anxiety. This anxiety takes many forms. In
Europe, parties debate immigration, the rights of minority sub-cultures,
and the threat posed by American cultural imports. The rise of anti-
immigration parties in France, Belgium, and Austria represent a back-
lash against the European Union and the free movement of workers. In
the former Soviet Union countries and Central and Eastern Europe, the
economic displacement caused by liberalization has been catastrophic
for many. One response has been the rise of extreme nationalism and
anti-Semitism. Globalization and the influx of western culture also
triggered the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Similarly, Hindu nation-
alism expresses the frustration of Indians toward the global economy.
This frustration takes the form of a rejection of western films, televi-
sion, and music. In all these countries, we witness an intense suspicion
towards foreign or global culture, which is viewed as liberal, homoge-
nizing, humanistic, and materialistic. Displaced anxiety to globalization
is the root cause of all these efforts to protect local culture from foreign
influence.
Cultural exceptions are the legalistic expression of this displaced
anxiety to globalization. When states invoke cultural exceptions to bar
trade liberalization, they are blocking the forward movement of globali-
zation. The international community rejects efforts to impede
globalization. As globalization creates social dislocation and cultural
anxieties, there is increased pressure for women to conform to hyper-
traditionalized roles as a kind of ballast against social disequilibrium. 363
When cultural exceptions are invoked to reclaim control over social in-
stitutions like family and marriage, the international community permits
exceptions that facilitate globalization by discharging political pressures
against global forces. In this way, cultural exceptions function to facili-
tate globalization. The cultural exception is an escape valve from the
internal political pressure of globalization. The international community
recognizes cultural exceptions only to the extent that they relieve dis-
placed anxiety to globalization without obstructing globalization.
When states regulate women (by denying them equal employment
opportunities, restricting reproductive rights, denying them certain
property rights, child custody or educational opportunities, exposing
them to physical violence, including genital cutting, or sexual harass-
363. See Narayan, supra note 48, at (1997) (describing how the conflict between mod-
ernization and Third World nationalism is often framed as a conflict to protect traditional
womanhood from Western colonizing culture).
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ment, imposing unwieldy dress requirements, limiting their freedom of
movement or their right to marry or divorce), states are reaffirming their
sovereignty through social controls without hindering the forward
movement of globalization. In these circumstances, the international
community defers to the cultural exception. In this way, the interna-
tional community channels political opposition to market liberalization
in a direction that does not pose a risk to globalization.
When states go further by limiting cultural imports, like magazines,
film, television or sound recordings, the international community rejects
the cultural exception. The W.T.O. does not tolerate cultural exceptions
that close markets. The danger is that culture can be so broadly defined
that any cultural exception might threaten to swallow the rule of nondis-
criminatory open trade.
Similarly, when states claim cultural exceptions against interna-
tional environmental norms, the international community generally
dismisses the cultural claim. The community recognizes that norms
protecting the global environment facilitate globalization in two re-
spects. First, these norms -maintain conditions that are necessary for
conducting business. The depletion of natural resources, the poisoning
of the air and water, or the loss of habitable space all endanger eco-
nomic growth and, can thwart foreign investment. If fossil fuel
emissions threaten climatic changes that could cause flooding in global
financial centers like New York, the restrictions on emissions must be
strictly enforced; there is no room for cultural exceptions. The I.W.C.'s
moratorium on whaling protects the marine environment that is a major
source of food; the international community is not prepared to risk the
marine environment to protect Japan's culture.
Second, international environmental norms discourage states from
acting unilaterally. Unilateral measures complicate patterns of trade and
investment. Where the international community recognizes the need for
environmental regulation, globalization is better served by a single
global standard rather than 200 national standards. The community al-
lows cultural exceptions to international environmental norms only
when there is no risk of environmental damage, and cultural exceptions
reaffirm the existing power relations between sovereign states and de-
pendent indigenous tribal nations.
My hypothesis is not the only plausible explanation for why the in-
ternational community regards cultural exceptions to the norm of gender
equality as authentically cultural and legitimate. There are at least three
other possible explanations. First, one could argue that the international
community distinguishes among possible cultural claims against inter-
national norms based upon economic self-interest. In other words, state
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actors reject cultural claims that interfere with their economic interest in
trade. On the other hand, states are more tolerate of cultural claims
against non-economic interests like gender equality. A second -related
explanation could be that the international community distinguishes
between rationality arguments and non-rationality arguments. The
community does not tolerate interference in the rationality of the market
by non-rationality considerations like culture. The international com-
munity considers human rights norms, like gender equality, to be more
commensurate with other non-rationality concerns like culture. The
community is willing to balance cultural claims against human rights
concerns, because neither of them is based upon pure rationality
arguments. A third alternative hypothesis is that gender subordination,
rather than globalization, explains the willingness of states to tolerate
cultural exceptions to gender equality norms. In the next three sub-
sections, I will examine these alternative hypotheses. In my view, each
of them may explain an aspect of the relationship between cultural ar-
guments and international legal norms, but none of these three
alternatives is sufficient to explain the cultural exception to the gender
equality norm.
B. First Alternative Hypothesis: Economic Interests Trump All
My globalization hypothesis might be challenged by arguing that all
I have shown is that the international community tolerates cultural re-
sistance to legal norms only when no economic interests are at stake.
This hypothesis might explain why international free trade norms trump
cultural claims, while cultural claims generally trump non-economic
interests like human rights.
There are two problems with this alternative hypothesis. First, non-
economic interests are not all subordinated to culture. For example,
most human rights norms, like freedom from arbitrary detention, slavery
or torture, are not generally subordinated to culture. Our hypothesis
must explain why gender norms, as opposed to other non-economic
rights, are uniquely subject to cultural exceptions.
Second, this hypothesis fails to account fully for the difficulty of
distinguishing between economic interest and culture and neglects the
complex relationship between culture and economics. As discussed
above, it is nearly impossible to define culture in a way that would
clearly exclude economic life. For example, when a state protects an
industry by imposing tariffs, it is also protecting the cultural life of the
community that depends upon that industry for its livelihood, as was the
case of Japan protecting the leather industry. Even if it were possible to
define culture as something apart from economic interest, cultural ex-
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ceptions and economic interests may favor the same or different out-
comes. In international trade, both importing and exporting states have
economic interests that may favor or disfavor imports. As we have seen,
when a cultural exception favors a domestic industry, the W.T.O. has
rejected the cultural exception as a form of disguised protectionism.
Rather than strengthening the cultural exception, the appearance of an
economic interest raises suspicion that the importing state has a protec-
tionist motive and weakens the legal claim.
Similarly, in international environmental disputes both sides often
have economic and non-economic cultural interests at stake. Under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act,364 for example, the United States re-
stricted the import of tuna harvested using nets that incidentally killed
dolphins. The United States acted with economic, cultural and environ-
mental motives. The U.S. tuna industry lobbied aggressively for the
restrictions on imported tuna, which offered significant economic pro-
tection to the domestic industry.365 In the absence of any evidence that
dolphins are endangered, the United States sought to protect dolphins in
part because of a strong cultural affinity for marine mammals. Mexico
brought a complaint to the GATT and a GATT panel has declared that
the U.S. ban on imported tuna violates GATT by discriminating against
foreign products.3" Again, the U.S. economic interest casts suspicion on
its environmental and cultural motives, thus weakening the legal de-
fense. Similarly, the opposition to whale hunting is partly based upon
evidence that some whale species may be endangered as well as a cul-
tural affinity for whales. Japan and Norway have a strong cultural
interest to continue whaling, but their motives are suspect because of
their economic interest in protecting domestic whaling.
Economic interests do not nullify all cultural exceptions to environ-
mental norms, however. As we have seen, the international community
acknowledged the cultural claim of the Makah to resume whale hunting in
part because of the dependency and economic interest of the tribe as well
as the moral strength of their claim. While economic interest tainted the
cultural claims of Canada in the magazine case or Japan and Norway in
the whaling case, economic interest strengthened the cultural claim of
the Makah. In sum, cultural exceptions to international norms cannot be
364. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(1) &
1378(a)(2) (1994).
365. See generally Richard Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect
the Global Commons: What Can We Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
366. However, the Contracting Partis to GATT did not adopt the Panel's report as re-
quired by the pre-1994 GAIT, and therefore, the panel report never became efffective.
United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
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explained simply by reference to economic interest. There is no clear
distinction between economic interest and cultural claims.
C. Second Alternative Hypothesis: The International Community
Distinguishes Rationality and Non-rationality Claims
Another possible explanation for why cultural claims against the
gender equality norm seem more compelling than cultural claims
against the free trade norm is that cultural and economic claims are
incommensurable. Economic arguments are based upon verifiable
propositions, unlike arguments based upon culture or human rights.
The whole legal structure of the free trade norm rests on a rational
economic model.367 When governments grant concessions to foreign im-
ports, they defend the cost to domestic import-competitors by invoking
the rationality of free trade. Cultural claims threaten that rationality ar-
gument. Cultural claims derive from sentiment, nostalgia, insecurity;
they are rooted in non-rationality. To protect the rationality of the mar-
ket from the non-rationality of nationalism and culture, the international
community rejects cultural exceptions.368
A similar relationship between rationality and non-rationality
shapes the discourse of environmental law. Environmental claims are
strongest when they are based on scientific data. The stronger the scien-
tific evidence that whales or sea turtles are endangered, the stronger the
norm that protects them from extinction. The I.W.C. moratorium on
whale hunting is supported by sufficient scientific evidence so that it
appears more rational than the appeal of the Norwegians and Japanese
to their cultural heritage. Again, the rationality of science must be pro-
tected from the non-rationality of culture.
Human rights, like culture, fall into the domain of non-rationality.
International human rights norms derive from the consent and practice
of states.369 In other words, as positivist jurisprudence has displaced
natural law, state power has displaced reason as the source of human
rights. International human rights norms flow from the consent of states;
they do not precede states, and they are not pre-political. When coun-
367. But see Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous
Market Fallacy, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 33-38 (1994) (showing how GATT promotes eco-
nomic rationality resting on a false presumption that markets set a "normal price" without
government interference).
368. I use the terms "rationality" and "non-rationality" to connote that these concerns
are not subject to scientific proof in the same way that economic or environmental concerns
may be provable. I am not suggesting, of course, that arguments for human rights are irra-
tional or non-rational.
369. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF PEACE 49-55 (6th ed. 1963).
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tries challenge the rights of women or sexual minorities based on relig-
ious or cultural grounds, they are invoking the non-rationality of faith or
culture. Women's rights are susceptible to cultural arguments because
both human rights and culture fall outside the realm of rational logic or
science.
The relationship between rational and non-rational claims may
partly explain why trade and environmental norms are strong, but it
does not fully explain why gender equality norms are weaker than other
human rights norms, or why cultural exceptions, which are no more ra-
tional than human rights norms, trump gender equality. Culture may be
non-rational, but it is not irrelevant. Culture serves an important func-
tion in the global system, and understanding the function of culture and
its relation to sovereignty may explain the relative strength and weak-
ness of different international legal norms.
D. Third Alternative Hypothesis: Gender Subordination
Another explanation for the disparate treatment of culture might be
that the subordination of women's equality to cultural circumstances is
a product of gender subordination rather than globalization. There is
substantial evidence that international law reproduces gender stereo-
types, and traditionally, the scope of international law excludes the
concerns of women and gender equality.37 ° Arguably, by allowing state
actors to claim that a norm of gender equality conflicts with a male-
dominated culture, public international law promotes gender hierarchy.
This explanation draws a dichotomy between globalization and gender
subordination that makes little sense, because globalization both reflects
and reinforces gender subordination.
Globalization represents a set of assumptions about how to organize a
market economy, and our image of a market economy, in turn, rests in
part on certain suppositions about gender roles and norms.37' Often, these
suppositions are so common that they become invisible. In broad terms,
370. See, e.g., Charlesworth et al., supra note 42 (international law is structurally bi-
ased against women); Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar in RECONCEIVING REALITY
1-60 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, ed., 1993).
371. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 64-141 (2000). For example, Professor
Williams points out that we provide greater economic rewards and career opportunities to
full-time workers than to part-time workers. Our idea of a full-time worker assumes that the
worker has no household or child-rearing responsibilities, and thus, the ideal worker is male.
Id. at 20-30. See also Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency, 19
SIGNS 309 (Winter 1994)(showing how the concept of welfare dependency in the United
States rests on assumptions about gender and race subordination implicit in a postindustrial
market economy that prizes individualism); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE
113-129 (1990)(arguing that the concept of fair wages in a market economy is itself gen-
dered).
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globalization enlarges the market in which men traditionally dominate.
Lowering trade barriers creates wage competition among low-skilled
workers in different exporting countries. Many multinational corporations
find that they can compete more effectively by employing greater num-
bers of women and children at lower wages. Economists usually regard
the impact of globalization on women as an unfortunate by-product of
privatization and competition rather than the logical outcome of their
own assumptions about the shape and character of a market.
One dramatic example of the impact of globalization on women is the
experience of the former communist countries transitioning toward mar-
ket economies. The former Soviet Union and the communist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe provided a wide range of pro-natal social wel-
fare support for young mothers, including childcare and health care. As
these economies privatized state-owned enterprises and lowered trade bar-
riers to increase competition, government programs for women were cut.
At the same time, newly privatized industries cut their labor costs by lay-
ing off workers. Employers disproportionately laid off women either
because many women were unable to work full-time, were presumptively
not the head of household or were regarded as less productive workers.
Many of these countries did not effectively prohibit gender discrimination.
As a result, unemployment among women soared just as prices became in-
flated. As economic conditions worsened, women suffered a disparate
impact. Not only were there fewer job opportunities for women, but a rise in
divorce rates and emigration of men left many more women to fend for
themselves without adequate government support. Poverty and prostitu-• 372
tion among women rose to levels unknown during the communist era.
Obviously, the economists who engineered the shift toward privatiza-
tion did not intend these results, but the policies they recommended were
dictated by a set of suppositions that made some social choices seem pos-
sible and not others. The necessity to shrink the public sector appeared
much greater than the need to ensure that women could survive independ-
ently of men. In these ways the infrastructure changes brought about by
globalization adversely affected women precisely because gender norms
372. See Francis E. Olsen, Feminism in Central and Eastern Europe, 106 YALE L.J.
2215 (1997)(the situation of many women in former communist countries worsened as a
result of the transition to market democracy). See generally Emily Stoper and Emilia laneva,
Democratization and Women's Employment Policy in Post-Communist Bulgaria, 12 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 9, 20-30 (1996)(discussing the effect of privatization on Bulgarian women and
citing statistics that show unemployment among women rose to 54.6 percent as of April,
1995. Id. at 21); Nicki Negrau, Listening to Women's Voices: Living in Post-Communist
Romania, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 117, 134-140 (1996)(discussing the reason for high unem-
ployment among women and quoting one Romanian women, "If a manager has to make a
lay-off decision, he will obviously keep the most loyal and competent employees. It is clear
that the employees who had other duties to fulfill outside of work are women...") Id. at 136.
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were embedded in the project of globalization. If we cannot separate the
fact of gender subordination from the project of globalization, then it is
not meaningful to ascribe causation to gender subordination as distinct
from globalization.373
E. Conclusion,
There is a double irony implicit in the discourse of cultural excep-
tions. The language of culture originated as a language of colonization
during the nineteenth century. With the end of colonization, former colo-
nies appropriated this language to defend their national sovereignty.
Today, globalization has replaced colonization as the dominant theme of
inter-state relations. States participate in globalization, while seeking to
preserve their cultural autonomy from global influences. As globalization
breeds discontent, state actors invoke cultural exceptions. The interna-
tional community rejects cultural exceptions to most international legal
norms. Only the rights of women and sexual minorities are bounded by
culture. Just as culture once legitimated colonization, today these cultural
373. In making this argument, I am not saying that globalization is necessarily bad for
women. Globalization and the shift to market democracy often leads to greater legal protec-
tion for women against employment discriminatioh. These gains to women in the
marketplace often are not matched by legal reforms in the private sphere. For example, as
discussed above, since globalization Chile has guaranteed equal employment opportunities
for women, but has resisted efforts to liberalize women's reproductive rights and access to
divorce. The Chilean experience might be understood by imagining a hypothetical island
country in a state of autarchy. The island has a patriarchal democracy in which women have
no civil, political or social rights. Now imagine that the island opens itself up to trade with
the rest of the world. For the first time, the island economy is flooded with imported goods
and services, multinational investment, and foreign advertising, films, television, books and
sound recordings. Further, imagine that as the rest of the world learns of the subordinate
status of women on the island, foreign governments, international bodies and non-
governmental organizations demand full equality for women on the island. How are the po-
litical leaders on the island likely to respond to these demands? At first the all-male
legislature might object to giving women any rights, but perhaps in time the government
begrudgingly grants some modest rights to women. What rights are women likely to win
first? Our collective hunch would be to expect cultural resistance to any reforms, but espe-
cially to reforms involving the family. It would be as if traditional gender roles were the last
refuge from foreign influence. Most likely, women would gain the right to work outside of
the home before they gained other family-related rights. We would probably expect to see
that the greatest resistance to gender equality would involve rights within the family, such as
reproductive rights, divorce, child custody, etc. This result may seem counter-intuitive.
Ceding jobs and economic independence to women may appear to threaten the economic
power men enjoy. Yet, by guaranteeing equal employment opportunities for women, the law
facilitates the rational allocation of labor resources and produces greater wealth for the
whole economy. On the other hand, extending certain legal rights to women in the private
sphere, like reproductive rights, divorce, and legal remedies to domestic violence, does not
necessarily yield economic benefits. Thus, resistance to gender equality is weakest in the
market and strongest in the home. This argument was first suggested to me by Professor
Amy Chua.
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exceptions facilitate globalization by channeling popular discontent with-
out impeding market liberalization. The discourse of cultural exceptions
serves the project of globalization at the expense of gender equality.
